The “Right” REDD Framework: National Laws that Best Protect Indigenous Rights in a Global REDD Regime by Baez, Stephanie
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 80 Issue 2 Article 14 
November 2011 
The “Right” REDD Framework: National Laws that Best Protect 
Indigenous Rights in a Global REDD Regime 
Stephanie Baez 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stephanie Baez, The “Right” REDD Framework: National Laws that Best Protect Indigenous Rights in a 
Global REDD Regime, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 821 (2011). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol80/iss2/14 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 821 
NOTES 
THE “RIGHT” REDD FRAMEWORK:  NATIONAL 
LAWS THAT BEST PROTECT INDIGENOUS 
RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL REDD REGIME 
Stephanie Baez*
 
 
This Note focuses on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD), an international framework that aims to curb carbon 
emissions by reducing deforestation.  While international negotiators 
discuss the environmental benefits of REDD, which will likely be 
implemented in the Kyoto Protocol’s post-2012 commitment period, forest-
dwelling indigenous communities worry that REDD will destroy their 
livelihoods.  Countries with high deforestation rates, such as Brazil and 
Indonesia, have already implemented a number of voluntary REDD pilot 
projects and are currently creating legal frameworks to address the 
complexities of REDD.  This Note compares the legal frameworks of Brazil 
and Indonesia in terms of how well they protect indigenous rights.  
Ultimately, the lives of indigenous peoples will be most affected by national 
laws that govern the implementation of REDD.  Accordingly, this Note 
provides suggestions on how to build a legal framework that capitalizes on 
the environmental and economic benefits of REDD while protecting the 
rights and livelihood of indigenous peoples. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the roof over his home in Amazonas, Brazil, sprung a leak, 
Antonio Alves ventured into the 1.57 million square kilometers1 of forest 
around him to gather wood.2  Instead of finding material to fix the leak, 
Alves found the Green Police,3 a group of local law enforcement officials 
hired by General Motors, American Electric Power, and Chevron.4  
Together these corporations spent $18 million to purchase the carbon 
dioxide sequestered inside 202 square kilometers of the Amazon forest.5  
Hoping forest conservation will allow them to offset their own emissions 
and make money on the carbon market, the companies created forest 
reserves and hired the Green Police to protect their investments.  “[I]f 
you’re not clear-cutting forest, just cutting three or four trees to build a 
house, I don’t think it’s a crime,” said Alves, who ended up with a gun to 
his neck as he tried to cut one tree.6  “They think it is.”7  After spending 
eleven days in jail, Alves eventually moved to avoid further harassment by 
the Green Police.8
Alves is not alone.  As science and economics convince international 
policymakers that forest protection will play a crucial role in the reduction 
of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,
 
9
 
 1. See Virgilio M. Viana, Seeing REDD in the Amazon:  A Win for People, Trees and 
Climate, INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T AND DEV., Mar. 2009, at 1. 
 indigenous peoples across the 
globe are being bound by land-use restrictions in forests they have 
 2. See Transcript, Frontline World:  The Carbon Hunters, PBS, available at 
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/carbonwatch/2009/05/the-carbon-hunters-
transcript-credits.html (transcript of PBS television broadcast of May 11, 2010). 
 3. Id.; see also Conservation Projects Displace Locals, MARKETPLACE:  AMERICAN 
PUBLIC MEDIA (Feb. 26, 2010), http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2010/02/26/
pm-brazil-two/ (noting that while the “Green Police,” or Força Verde, are hired to ensure 
that land developers and poachers do not cut down trees or otherwise destroy the ecosystem, 
forest-dwelling people protest that they are unfairly prevented from using forest resources). 
 4. See Mark Schapiro, GM’s Money Trees, MOTHER JONES, Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 61–62.   
 5. See id. (noting that the companies purchased 50,000 acres, which is equivalent to 
202 square kilometers). 
 6. Transcript, supra note 2. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. The world currently emits forty gigatons of carbon dioxide (CO2) each year, causing 
the atmosphere to contain 425 parts per million (ppm) of GHGs.  In order to avoid dangerous 
levels of CO2, many scientists recommend that the atmospheric concentration of GHGs be 
stabilized at 450 ppm.  To achieve this, global CO2 emissions should be reduced to five 
gigatons per year. See generally Climate Change 2007:  Synthesis Report, 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf [hereinafter Climate Change 2007] (suggesting that if 
major climate catastrophes are to be avoided, CO2 emissions should peak within the next ten 
to twenty years, and then begin to decline); Climate Change “Can Be Tackled,” BBC (May 
4, 2007) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6620909.stm (noting that CO2 
stabilization at 450 ppm would prevent the world’s average temperature from increasing 
more than two degrees Celsius, which would be a dangerous temperature rise).  The most 
cost-effective way to curb emissions is through avoided deforestation projects, such as 
REDD.  For elaboration on the economic impact of avoided deforestation, see JOHN 
ELIASCH, CLIMATE CHANGE:  FINANCING GLOBAL FORESTS:  THE ELIASCH REVIEW (2008) and 
NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE:  THE STERN REVIEW (2007). 
824 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
traditionally considered home.10  The most developed method of forest 
conservation is Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD), which allows governments and private companies to 
offset their own carbon emissions by paying to keep forests standing, and, 
in effect, purchasing the carbon that is stored inside.11
While the forest carbon market is growing exponentially, many 
indigenous groups fear that they will not see the benefits of REDD, and 
may actually be harmed, by it.
 
12  For the indigenous, trees do much more 
than store carbon; they provide food, shelter, and livelihood.13  
Deforestation can also be an essential part of indigenous income, as 
agricultural expansion, logging activities, and infrastructure creation all 
contribute to the economic well-being of forest-dwelling peoples.14  
Although REDD has positive environmental goals, indigenous groups are 
concerned that these goals will be achieved at the expense of their 
livelihood, while allowing developed nations to continue “business as 
usual.”15  In order to ensure that indigenous peoples can co-exist with 
REDD, avoided deforestation programs must protect indigenous rights to 
self-determination, informed consent, and property.16
This Note focuses on the impact that national legal frameworks will have 
on rights protection in a global REDD regime.  Regardless of international 
REDD agreements, the lives of indigenous peoples will be most directly 
influenced by the national laws that regulate forest governance.
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 10. See Nicholas Anderson, REDDy or Not?  The Effects on Indigenous Peoples in 
Brazil of a Global Mechanism for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation, 
2 J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. 18 (2009) (detailing how REDD has prevented indigenous peoples 
from using forests for traditional practices). See generally Tom Griffiths, Seeing ‘REDD’?  
Forests, Climate Change Mitigation and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local 
Communities, FOREST PEOPLES PROGRAMME (May 2009), 
http://www.rightsandresources.org/documents/files/doc_923.pdf (explaining how REDD 
programs preclude indigenous peoples from using forests for economic purposes). 
  After 
explaining the background of REDD and indigenous rights in Part I, this 
Note compares the legal frameworks of two countries with the world’s 
highest deforestation rates—Brazil and Indonesia—in terms of how their 
 11. See John Vidal, Q&A:  Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD), GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2009/sep/24/redd-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation. 
 12. See generally Griffiths, supra note 10 (noting that indigenous groups have not been 
able to participate in the decision-making stages of REDD). 
 13. See Viana, supra note 1. 
 14. See id.; see also Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff et al., Reducing Forest Emissions in the 
Amazon Basin:  A Review of Drivers of Land-Use Change and How Payments for 
Environmental Services (PES) Schemes Can Affect Them 7–9 (Ctr. for Int’l Forestry 
Research, Working Paper No. 40, 2008), available at http://www.cifor.org/publications/
pdf_files/WPapers/WP40Wertz-Kanounnikoff.pdf. 
 15. Griffiths, supra note 10, at 21. 
 16. See, e.g., Kathleen Lawlor & David Huberman, Reduced Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) and Human Rights, in RIGHTS BASED 
APPROACHES:  EXPLORING ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONSERVATION 269, 281–82 
(Jessica Campese et al. eds., 2009). 
 17. See Alejandro Iza, Foreword to JOHN COSTENBADER, LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR 
REDD:  DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL ix, ix (John Costenbader ed., 
2009) (noting that national legal clarity is essential to a successful REDD program). 
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national REDD regulations affect indigenous populations.  Part III then 
argues that a national legal framework which clearly defines forest 
governance—including carbon property rights, REDD financing, and 
benefits distribution—should be implemented in any country that adopts 
REDD programs.  Lastly, this Note closes by making recommendations for 
a legal framework that best protects indigenous rights to property, informed 
consent, and self-determination. 
I.  REDDY OR NOT:  REDD’S SUDDEN PROMINENCE AND HOW IT IMPACTS 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
In November of 2009, one week before the 15th Conference of the 
Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(COP-15) gathered in Copenhagen to discuss the future of the Kyoto 
Protocol,18 the summit was hailed as “the most important [international 
meeting] since World War II.”19  COP-15 was expected to yield an 
international agreement on the successor to the Kyoto Protocol, which will 
expire in 2012.20  Ratified by 193 parties,21 the Kyoto Protocol sets 
mandatory limits on the production of six greenhouse gases, and 
demonstrates the “near universal recognition of the seriousness of . . . 
climate change . . . for the future of the world.”22
 
 18. The Conference of the Parties (COP) is a yearly gathering of the Parties to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the primary 
international agreement to mitigate climate change. See U.N. Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, art. 7, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.  The UNFCCC is a framework 
treaty that is meant to be adapted over time in light of new information.  During each annual 
COP summit, international negotiators discuss potential amendments. See, e.g., Convention 
Bodies, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/convention_bodies/items/2629.php (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
  COP-15 is generally 
regarded as a failure because the parties did not agree on binding 
commitments for the reduction of GHG levels in the post-2012 commitment 
 19. Lara Lázaro, Climate Change Talks:  Breakdown in Copenhagen:  Next Stop, 
Mexico 2010 (COP 16), ELCANO ROYAL INSTITUTE (Sept. 3, 2010), 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?size320=50&ots591=
0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=122367.  
 20. The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol began on January 1, 2008 and 
will end on December 31, 2012. See Daniel Bodansky, W[h]ither the Kyoto Protocol?  
Durban and Beyond, HARVARD PROJECT ON CLIMATE AGREEMENTS, 1 (Aug. 2011), 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Bodansky_Viewpoint-Final.pdf.  For a subsequent 
commitment period to begin on January 1, 2013, amendments to the Protocol must enter into 
force on or before that date. See 3rd Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, Japan, Dec. 1–10, 1997, Kyoto Protocol 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, ¶ 3.7, U.N. DOC. 
FCCC/CP/1997/7, Dec. 10, 1997 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
 21. See Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/
items/2613.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
 22. Richard L. Ottinger, Introduction:  Copenhagen Climate Change Conference—
Success or Failure?, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 411, 412–13 (2010); see also Kyoto Protocol, 
supra note 20, ¶ 3.1 (establishing a framework for developed nations to “reduc[e] their 
overall emissions of [greenhouse] gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the 
commitment period 2008 to 2012”). 
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period.23  They did, however, agree that emissions reduction credits for 
avoided deforestation (REDD) projects will be included in the post-Kyoto 
protocol.24  Although the Copenhagen Accord is neither binding nor 
specific, it shifted the debate from if to how REDD will be implemented.25
This Part provides background on REDD, focusing on its environmental 
and social impacts.  It first explores the environmental benefits of forest 
protection, and then traces the history of REDD in international agreements.  
Part I.C. highlights the numerous policy uncertainties that still exist in 
REDD implementation, and finally, Part I.D. analyzes REDD and 
indigenous rights, looking at the potential risks and rewards REDD could 
bestow upon indigenous communities. 
 
A.  The Role of Forests in Curbing Climate Change 
According to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), climate change occurs when the composition of the 
global atmosphere is altered, either directly or indirectly, by human 
activity.26  Power generation, deforestation, transportation, and agriculture 
all produce greenhouse gases—such as carbon dioxide—that cause 
temperatures to rise across the globe.27  Because climate change is 
“intricately intertwined with . . . population growth, desertification and land 
degradation, air and water pollution [and] loss of biodiversity,” it has been 
identified as an international crisis.28
The consequences of climate change are especially severe for indigenous 
peoples, who are among the poorest and most marginalized in the world, 
and often also live in areas most affected by rising temperature.
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 23. See generally Daniel Bodansky, The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference:  A 
Postmortem, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 230, 240 (2010). 
  Because 
their livelihoods frequently depend upon land use and natural resources, 
 24. See 15th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7–18, 2009, Copenhagen Accord, ¶ 6 U.N. DOC. 
FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Dec. 18. 2009) [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord] (“We recognize the 
crucial role of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the need to 
enhance removals of greenhouse gas emission by forests and agree on the need to provide 
positive incentives to such actions through the immediate establishment of a mechanism 
including REDD-plus, to enable the mobilization of financial resources from developed 
countries.”). 
 25. Ottinger, supra note 22, at 417 (noting that “[o]ne of the most important 
accomplishments” of COP-15 was an agreement on the architecture and funding of REDD). 
 26. Climate Change Glossary, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/text/html/list_search.php?what=keywords
&val=&valan=a&anf=0&id=10 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
 27. See, e.g., LENNY BERNSTEIN ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:  SYNTHESIS REPORT 5 (2008). 
 28. Charlotte Streck et al., Climate Change and Forestry:  An Introduction, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND FORESTS:  EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 3, 3 (Charlotte 
Streck ed., 2008). 
 29. See Annelie Fincke, Indigenous Peoples and REDD-plus:  Challenges and 
Opportunities for the Engagement of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities in REDD-
plus, INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE, 2 (June 2010), 
http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/iucn_briefing_ips_and_redd_aug_2010_summary.pdf. 
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indigenous groups are at great risk as climate change depletes resources and 
pushes them from their traditional homes.30
To combat climate change, the international community has principally 
focused on reducing the amount of carbon dioxide that is released into the 
atmosphere by industrial and energy sectors.
 
31  The focus is now shifting to 
the reduction of forest carbon emissions,32 however, as it is recognized that 
deforestation is a major contributor to climate change.33  The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a United Nations body 
containing over 2,000 scientists who analyze evidence on climate change, 
estimates that the forestry sector is responsible for 17.4 percent of global 
GHG emissions, placing it above the transportation and industry sectors, 
which account for 14 percent of global emissions each.34
Forests are the world’s most important terrestrial carbon “sink,” or 
storehouse of carbon.
 
35  The Earth’s carbon naturally cycles through four 
main sinks:  geological, oceanic, terrestrial, and atmospheric.36  One “goal 
of climate change initiatives” is to “reduce the amount of carbon in the 
atmospheric store and increase the amount that is sequestered in one of the 
other three reservoirs.”37  Forests remove carbon from the atmosphere and 
sequester it in their biomass and soils, which contain approximately 60 
percent of the carbon that is stored in terrestrial sinks.38
When a forest is destroyed (for example, cut down for timber or burned), 
the harmful effects are twofold:  not only is the carbon sequestered in each 
tree released into the atmosphere, but also the remaining forest’s capacity to 
absorb carbon from the atmosphere is diminished.
 
39  As a result, 
deforestation, which is the “permanent removal of forest cover,” contributes 
significantly to global carbon dioxide emissions.40
 
 30. See id. 
  In fact, in “2002 [the] 
rate of forest loss in Brazil and Indonesia alone . . . produced four-fifths as 
 31. See Streck et al., supra note 28, at 3–4. 
 32. See id. at 4. 
 33. Seeing the Wood:  Special Report:  Forests, ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 2010, at 3–6. 
 34. See Climate Change 2007, supra note 9; see also Daniel Howden, Deforestation:  
The Hidden Cause of Global Warming, INDEP. (May 2007) 
http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/deforestation-the-hidden-cause-
of-global-warming-448734.html (noting that in a 24-hour period, deforestation emits the 
same amount of carbon as 8 million people flying from New York to London). 
 35. Dennis D. Hirsch, Trading in Ecosystem Services:  Carbon Sinks and the Clean 
Development Mechanism, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 623, 628 (2007) (defining a carbon 
sink as “a process, activity, or mechanism that removes GHG . . . from the atmosphere and 
then stores them”). 
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Jiarui Dong et al., Remote Sensing Estimates of Boreal and Temperate Forest Woody 
Biomass:  Carbon Pools, Sources, and Sinks, 84 REMOTE SENSING OF ENV’T 393, 393 
(2003). 
 39. See generally G. Bala et al., Combined Climate and Carbon-Cycle Effects of Large-
Scale Deforestation, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6550 (2007). 
 40. Ross Andrew Clarke, Moving the REDD Debate from Theory to Practice:  Lessons 
Learned from the ULU Masen Project, 6 LAW ENV’T & DEV. J. 36, 39 (2010) (explaining the 
harmful effects of forest degradation, as well as deforestation, and defining “forest 
degradation” as “gradual changes that negatively affect forest production capacity”). 
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many greenhouse gases as the Annex I [developed]41 countries committed 
to reduce that year under the Kyoto Protocol.”42
Because forests are immense carbon sinks, many scientists and 
policymakers alike agree that they should play an important role in curbing 
climate change.
 
43
B.  The Road to REDD 
  REDD is the best-developed international proposal for 
forest conservation.  Part I.B. traces the history of REDD, which is 
expected to be a legally binding part of the post-2012 successor to the 
Kyoto Protocol.  Currently, REDD exists solely as a series of pilot projects 
that are guided by non-binding international agreements.  Beginning with 
the Kyoto Protocol, Part I.B. discusses the inclusion—or exclusion—of 
REDD in international climate change legislation and explains how REDD 
proposals have changed over time, ending with the projection of a legally 
binding global REDD regime. 
Despite the recognized link between deforestation and climate change, 
avoided deforestation projects were excluded from the Kyoto Protocol’s 
2008–12 commitment period, in large part because of practical concerns.44  
Due to the difficulties of monitoring and verifying carbon emissions that are 
reduced from avoided deforestation, negotiators decided to limit the 
inclusion of forestry projects in the Kyoto Protocol to afforestation—the 
planting of trees on land that was not previously forested —and 
reforestation, which refers to recently cleared forestland.45
Avoided deforestation became a key part of international discussions in 
2005, when the Coalition of Rainforest Nations (CfRN), led by Costa Rica 
and Papua New Guinea, proposed “RED” at COP-11 in Montreal.
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 41. According to the UNFCCC, Annex I nations “include the industrialized countries 
that were members of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition (the EIT Parties), 
including the Russian Federation, the Baltic States, and several Central and Eastern 
European States.” Parties and Observers, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php (last visited Oct. 
20, 2011).  Annex I nations are the only countries bound by mandatory carbon emission 
reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. Id. 
  
 42. Michael L. Brown, Note, Limiting Corrupt Incentives in a Global REDD Regime, 37 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 237, 239 (2010); see also David Takacs, Carbon into Gold:  Forest Carbon 
Offsets, Climate Change Adaptation, and International Law, 15 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 39, 56 (2009). 
 43. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 44. See Frances Seymour, Forests, Climate Change, and Human Rights:  Managing Risk 
and Trade-offs, CTR. FOR INT’L FORESTRY RESEARCH, 6 (Oct. 2008), http://www.cbd.int/
doc/meetings/tk/redd-ilc-01/other/redd-ilc-01-cifor-en.pdf; see also David Freestone, 
Foreword, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS, supra note 28, at ix, x (noting that avoided 
deforestation was kept out of international climate change discussions for political and 
methodological reasons, including disagreements among Annex I nations and difficulties 
with emissions leakage and additionality). 
 45. See ROSS W. GORTE & JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34560, 
FOREST CARBON MARKETS:  POTENTIAL AND DRAWBACKS 3 (2008). 
 46. 11th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Montreal, Can., Nov. 28–Dec. 9, 2005, Reducing Emissions from 
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Focusing solely on deforestation (not forest degradation, hence only one 
“D”) the CfRN called on UNFCCC parties to “take note of present rates of 
deforestation within developing nations, acknowledge the resulting carbon 
emissions, and consequently open dialogue to develop scientific, technical, 
policy and capacity responses to address such emissions resulting from 
tropical deforestation.”47  The COP-11 parties agreed to submit CfRN’s 
RED proposal to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice 
(SBSTA) for a further study on deforestation, to be reviewed at COP-12.48
Avoided deforestation programs gained further support following the 
release of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change in 2007.
 
49  
The “most comprehensive synthesis of data concerning the economic 
impacts of climate change,” the Stern Review identifies avoided 
deforestation as the cheapest option for mitigating emissions of greenhouse 
gases.50
At COP-13 in Bali, the UNFCCC parties agreed upon the “Bali 
Roadmap,” a timeline for the development of an international REDD 
proposal.
  In light of the environmental and economic evidence produced by 
the CfRN proposal and Stern Review findings, RED moved to the forefront 
of international climate change discussions. 
51  The forward-looking Roadmap was designed to create climate 
change legislation beyond the Kyoto Protocol, emphasizing the importance 
of “long-term cooperative action” within the international community.52  
The Bali Roadmap targeted COP-15 (the 2009 summit in Copenhagen) as 
the deadline for an agreement on a comprehensive post-Kyoto plan.53  
Additionally, the parties identified forest degradation as a major source of 
emissions that should be discussed in conjunction with deforestation, and 
specifically identified an “urgent need” to take further action with REDD 
implementation.54
 
Deforestation in Developing Countries:  Approaches to Stimulate Action, U.N. DOC. 
FCCC/CP/2005/L.2 (2005) [hereinafter RED Proposal]. 
 
 47. Id. at Submission by the Governments of Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, at 2. 
 48. See Convention Bodies, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/convention_bodies/items/2629.
php (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) (explaining that the SBSTA follows a specific mandate to 
give advice to the COP on land-use issues). 
 49. See generally STERN, supra note 9 (arguing that it is more cost-effective for 
developed nations to reduce carbon emissions via offsets from REDD projects than to 
convert their fossil-fuel-dependent economies and reduce emissions domestically). 
 50. Daniel Watts, Capping Deforestation Emissions in Developing Countries Equitably 
and Effectively, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 819, 822 (2010). 
 51. See 13th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Bali, Indon., Dec. 3–15, 2007, Report of the Conference of the Parties on 
its Thirteenth Session, U.N. DOC FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Bali 
Roadmap]. 
 52. Id. ¶ 1. 
 53. See Chris Spence et al., Great Expectations:  Understanding Bali and the Climate 
Change Negotiations Process, 17 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 142, 151 
(2008). 
 54. Bali Roadmap, supra note 51, ¶ 1(b)(iii) (deciding that, by COP-15, the international 
community should develop “[p]olicy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to 
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and 
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Although the Bali Roadmap led to Copenhagen, COP-15 was ultimately 
not as successful as most had hoped.55  Instead of developing the successor 
to the Kyoto Protocol, COP-15 yielded the Copenhagen Accord, a “non-
binding political statement outlining principles to keep global warming to 2 
degrees Celsius.”56  In terms of REDD, the Copenhagen Accord recognizes 
the importance of including REDD in future legislation, calls for the 
“immediate establishment” of a mechanism to mobilize resources for 
REDD, and emphasizes the “need to provide positive incentives” to 
encourage REDD support.57  The Copenhagen Accord loosely outlines a 
framework for “REDD-Plus”—an expanded version of REDD that would 
include the maintenance of forest carbon stocks as well as avoided 
deforestation and degradation—but does not provide concrete guidance for 
REDD plans.58
Following the disappointment of the Copenhagen summit, international 
negotiators did not have high expectations going into Cancun’s COP-16, 
held in December 2010.
  Despite the vague language of the Copenhagen Accord, it 
ensures REDD’s place in future climate change legislation. 
59  Worse than reaching an impasse regarding the 
details of a climate change plan, the parties were unable to agree on whether 
the Kyoto Protocol should have a second commitment period at all.60  After 
two weeks of negotiations, the parties agreed upon the Cancun Accord,61
 
the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest 
carbon stocks in developing countries”). 
 a 
 55. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. 
 56. Florence Daviet, From Copenhagen to Cancun:  Forests and REDD+, WORLD 
RESEARCH INST. (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.wri.org/stories/2010/11/copenhagen-cancun-
forests-and-redd; see also Bodansky, supra note 23, at 231 (noting that objections by a small 
group of countries—led by Sudan, Venezuela and Bolivia—prevented the Copenhagen 
Conference from officially “adopting” the Accord and instead caused the Conference to take 
“note of” the Copenhagen Accord, leaving its future status uncertain). 
 57. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 24, ¶ 6. 
 58. Tom Griffiths notes that the change from REDD to REDD+ occurred in March 
2009, and “has since been used as the official definition of REDD in the negotiating text for 
an agreement in Copenhagen that includes Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks, notably reforestation, afforestation and plantations.” 
Griffiths, supra note 10, at 5.  For purposes of clarity, this Note uses REDD as a synonym 
for REDD+. 
 59. See The United Nations Climate Conference in Cancun, COP-16, UNITED NATIONS 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_16/items/
5571.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2011); see also Lisa Friedman, Sandy, White Beaches and a 
‘Toxic’ Issue Confront Negotiators as Cancun Talks Begin, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/11/29/29climatewire-sandy-white-beaches-and-a-toxic-
issue-confro-40061.html?pagewanted=all (noting that the future of the Kyoto Protocol was 
uncertain before the Cancun Summit, with many policymakers expecting negotiation 
breakdowns and mass walk-outs instead of an agreement); Gregory Hudson, Cancun:  Will 
COP 16 Live Up to Low Expectations?, TRADE & ENV’T REV., Dec. 2010, at 2–16 
(explaining that, after the Copenhagen Summit failed to yield a binding agreement, 
commentators believed that a comprehensive emissions reductions agreement at Cancun was 
not possible). 
 60. See Alister Doyle, Kyoto Impasse Still Blocks U.N. Climate Talks:  India, REUTERS 
(Dec. 9, 2010, 4:45 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6B83ZP20101209. 
 61. 16th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Cancun, Mex., Nov. 29–Dec. 10, 2010, Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc 
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“brilliant” compromise that allowed each nation to get its way in some 
area62—except Bolivia, who adamantly objected to the entire 
agreement63—and avoided the question of a Kyoto successor altogether.64  
Although the Cancun Accord will be fully adopted, it leaves open the 
question of whether its measures will be legally binding.65
Despite the disagreements surrounding the Cancun Accord, the COP-16 
parties reached a consensus on REDD.
 
66  Regardless of whether there is a 
post-Kyoto agreement, the international community is committed to 
creating REDD legislation.67  Building upon the REDD text that has been 
discussed in previous COP summits, the Cancun Accord added guidance on 
REDD-capacity-building measures to ensure that developing countries are 
able to implement REDD effectively.68  The Accord advocates a phased 
approach, with three readiness phases:  planning, implementation, and 
results-based activities.69  To undertake REDD activities, each country 
must develop a national REDD plan, a national reference emission level, a 
national forest monitoring system, and a system to address safeguards for 
indigenous peoples’ rights.70
Despite the agreement in Cancun, the international REDD text still leaves 
a number of unanswered questions.  Key policy uncertainties include the 
definition of “forest,” the scope and scale of REDD activities, and REDD 
 
 
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, U.N. DOC. 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/L.7 (2010) [hereinafter Cancun Accord]. 
 62. The Cancun Accord helped close the gap between rich and poor nations, for 
example, by developing the Green Climate Fund to raise $100 billion to assist poor nations 
with carbon emissions reductions (something that pleases poor nations), and mandating that 
the fund be controlled by the World Bank (at the request of rich nations, like the United 
States). See, e.g., Lisa Friedman, Cancun Agreement Preserves an Escape Hatch for Japan 
and Other Industrial Nations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/12/17/17climatewire-cancun-agreement-preserves-an-
escape-hatch-f-38242.html?pagewanted=all (interviewing Ned Helme, President of Center 
for Clean Air Policy, who describes the Cancun Accord as “really clever” because “[e]ach 
step of the way, it’s got a piece that’s taken care of each [nation’s] thing”). 
 63. See Climate Change Diplomacy:  Back from the Brink, ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 2010, 
at 121 (explaining that Bolivia was the sole objector to the Cancun Accord, causing the 
parties to hold that the “principle of consensus on which the conference runs does not give 
one country the right to veto the will of all the others,” and allowing the Cancun Accord to 
be fully adopted). 
 64. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 62 (noting that the Cancun Accord left the question 
of a Kyoto successor open because Japan and other industrialized countries refused to 
commit to mandatory emissions reductions post-2012; however, many commentators believe 
that by virtue of reaching an agreement, the COP-16 parties indicated that there will be a 
second Kyoto commitment period). 
 65. See UN Climate Change Talks in Cancun Agree [to] a Deal, BBC (Dec. 11, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-11975470. 
 66. Cancun Accord, supra note 61, § III.C, ¶¶ 68–79. 
 67. See Christian Schwägerl & Gerald Traufetter, Cancun Climate Summit:  Can 
Rainforests Be Saved with Cash Injections?, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Dec. 7, 2010), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,733270,00.html. 
 68. Cancun Accord, supra note 61, § III (C), ¶ 71. 
 69. Id. § III (C), ¶ 73. 
 70. Id. § III (C), ¶ 71(a)–(d). 
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financing.71
C.  REDD Realities:  Differing Implementations of International Guidelines 
  Section I.C. explores how REDD pilot projects have 
developed in each of these areas absent international guidance. 
Although the international community has agreed on the general 
framework for REDD, there has yet to be a “consensus proposal[] for the 
system’s design.”72  Thus, REDD remains a collection of country proposals 
and pilot projects, rather than a unified international plan.  Existing REDD 
projects differ on everything from their definitions of “forest” to their 
methods of financing to their scales of implementation, causing scholars to 
note that the only shared attribute in REDD programs is a lack of clarity.73  
As negotiators discuss the implementation of an international REDD 
regime, it is important that there is consistency in key “unanswered 
questions.”74
1.  Definitions:  What Is a “Forest”? 
  This Section highlights some of the diverse and often 
contradictory policy practices in existing REDD projects. 
The UNFCCC defines “forest” as an area greater than 0.5-1 hectares (ha) 
in size with 10–30 percent covered by canopy consisting of trees that reach 
a height of at least two to five meters at maturity.75  This definition 
identifies canopy cover, rather than biomass content, as the defining 
characteristic of a forest.  UNFCCC negotiators agreed on this definition 
because tree crown cover is easier to monitor and measure than biomass, 
and “plays a vital role in biosphere and atmosphere interactions.”76  
Further, canopy cover has been an essential part of the definition of “forest” 
that the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) has used for decades, 
and thus has an established place in international law.77
Critics of the UNFCCC definition argue that by not focusing on the 
biomass content of a forest, the definition does not differentiate between 
plantations and natural forests.  As a result, it is possible that “natural 
forests that are severely degraded or converted to plantations technically 
remain classified as forests.”
 
78
 
 71. See infra Part I.C.1–4. 
  Because it is possible for biomass content to 
 72. See Brown, supra note 42, at 259. 
 73. See John Costenbader, Introduction to LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR REDD, supra note 
17, at 3, 9. 
 74. See Kemen Austin et al., The REDD+ Decision in Cancun, WORLD RES. INST. (Dec. 
20, 2010), http://wri.org/stories/2010/12/redd-decision-cancun. 
 75. Nophea Sasaki & Francis E. Putz, Critical Need for New Definitions of “Forest” 
and “Forest Degradation” in Global Climate Change Agreements, CONSERVATION LETTERS, 
Oct. 2009, at 226, 227. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. (noting an important distinction between the FAO definition, which used a 40% 
tree crown cover to define “closed forest,” and the UNFCCC definition which “left it to each 
country . . . to select a minimum threshold of only 10-30%,” so a country could choose the 
lower number). 
 78. See Gavin Doyle, Additionality and Permanence, in LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR 
REDD, supra note 17, at 81, 89. 
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be removed from a forest without “recognition of the loss of carbon,” 
environmentalists worry that forestry companies could continue to collect 
carbon payments, even while damaging a forest’s ability to sequester 
carbon.79
Because of the disagreement surrounding the UNFCCC definition of 
forest, many countries have codified their own definitions in national laws.  
For example, the Indonesian definition of forest explicitly states that tree 
plantations cannot be classified as forests.
 
80  Due to the difference in 
definitions, forestry projects that receive credit under the UNFCCC might 
not be recognized under Indonesian law.81  This inconsistency is troubling 
as it may distort statistics and ultimately result in a system that rewards 
countries for forest loss.82
2.  Scope:  What Activities Are Included in REDD? 
 
As avoided deforestation projects have moved from RED to REDD to 
REDD+, the types of activities that will be included in each scheme have 
changed in scope.  Early discussions limited REDD to avoiding 
deforestation and forest degradation.83  In Copenhagen, however, 
negotiators referenced five types of REDD activities:  reducing emissions 
from deforestation, reducing emissions from forest degradation, 
conservation of forest carbon stocks, sustainable management of forests, 
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.84
Ultimately the Copenhagen Accords only included three activities—
avoided deforestation, avoided degradation, and conservation of carbon 
stocks—but a more expansive scope appeals to nations which do not have a 
history of deforestation or have already made significant conservation 
progress.
 
85  These nations argue that REDD should encourage positive 
forest changes, in addition to reducing negative ones, thereby creating more 
opportunities for international participation in REDD.86  Costa Rica, for 
example, significantly halted deforestation between 1997 and 2005, before 
REDD reached the forefront of international debate.87
 
 79. Rhett A. Butler, Weak Forest Definition May Undermine REDD Efforts, MONGABAY 
(Aug. 20, 2009), http://news.mongabay.com/2009/0819-forests.html. 
  Under the 
 80. See Background Analysis of REDD Regulatory Frameworks, 44 (Oct. 2009), 
http://www.terrestrialcarbon.org/site/DefaultSite/filesystem/documents/TCG-2009-
Background-Analysis-of-REDD-Regulatory-Frameworks.pdf. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See Griffiths, supra note 10, at 5. 
 83. See Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff, Global REDD Negotiations:  Update and Key 
Issues, in REDD, FOREST GOVERNANCE AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS:  THE EMERGING AGENDA 
21, 23 (Oliver Springate-Baginski & Eva Wollenberg eds., 2010). 
 84. See Daviet, supra note 56. 
 85. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 24. 
 86. See Wertz-Kanounnikoff, supra note 83, at 23–24. 
 87. See Kwaw S. Andam et al., Protected Areas and Avoided Deforestation:  A 
Statistical Evaluation, GLOBAL ENV’T FACILITY, 3 (Aug. 2007), http://www.duke.edu/~asp9/
files/ParksImpacts-GEFreport-AndamEtal.pdf (“Costa Rica has one of the most widely 
lauded protected areas systems and is a leader in the debate to have ‘avoided deforestation’ 
credits recognized by the Kyoto Protocol.”). 
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Copenhagen proposal, Costa Rica would have minimal participation in 
REDD, as enhancement and sustainable management of forest carbon are 
not included.88  To bypass this problem, some scholars have proposed 
categorizing REDD activities to allow each country to be involved with 
REDD on different levels.89
3.  Scale:  Is REDD Implemented on a National or Project Level? 
  Under this proposal, REDD would change the 
behavior of countries with high deforestation rates and reward countries that 
have traditionally maintained their forests, thereby alleviating any pressure 
they may feel to participate in deforestation in the future. 
An additional variable in REDD proposals is the scale, or “geographical 
level,” on which REDD accounting and distribution will take place.90  In 
order to be effective, a REDD plan must accurately measure whether 
emissions from deforestation are actually being reduced.  The REDD plan 
then must provide incentives such as carbon credits or community funding 
to reward past reductions and/or entice future efforts.91  There are three 
possible ways to measure and reward reduced deforestation:  on the national 
level, the sub-national level, or through a nested approach, which is a 
hybrid of the first two.92
a.  National Approach 
 
A majority of the country proposals submitted to the UNFCCC advocate 
a national scale.  Under this approach, a State would establish a national 
reference level to determine the baseline amount of deforestation 
countrywide.93  If, after a defined monitoring period, deforestation was 
reduced as compared to the national reference level, a national government 
agency would be rewarded with REDD payments from the international 
community.94  National payments could include tradable carbon credits or 
money from a global climate change fund.95
The national approach would preclude a country from receiving direct 
credits for emissions that are reduced on the sub-national level; however, in 
order to reduce total national emissions from deforestation, a government 
 
 
 88. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 24, ¶ 7. 
 89. One example of a phased approach to REDD is the following:  Stage One would 
involve countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ghana, whose REDD 
programs would focus on avoiding leakage and future deforestation. See Wertz-
Kanounnikoff, supra note 83, at 23–24.  Stage Two countries like Indonesia and Brazil 
would avoid deforestation and forest degradation, while Stage Three countries such as India 
and Costa Rica would continue forest conservation. Id.  Finally, Vietnam, China, and other 
Stage Four nations would continue afforestation and reforestation projects. Id. 
 90. See Arild Angelsen et al., What is the Right Scale for REDD?, in MOVING AHEAD 
WITH REDD:  ISSUES, OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 31, 31 (Arild Angelson ed., 2008). 
 91. See Summary, in MOVING AHEAD WITH REDD, supra note 90, at viii, viii–x. 
 92. See Angelsen et al., supra note 90, at 31. 
 93. See John Costenbader, Benefit Sharing, in LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR REDD, supra 
note 17, at 57, 62. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See Angelsen et al., supra note 90, at 34. 
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could implement laws and policies to entice local communities to reduce 
deforestation.96  Thus, the national approach gives the government wide 
discretion to implement policies that will reduce deforestation and forest 
degradation.97  This could work to the advantage of indigenous peoples, 
since the national government would be responsible for paying for “any 
necessary policy and administrative reforms” as well as the monitoring and 
verification mechanisms, thereby reducing the financial burden of forest 
communities.98  Additionally, a national approach may create laws that 
“align with national development strategies and bring long-term 
development benefits.”99
Despite these advantages, many indigenous groups disfavor a national 
approach because their ability to participate in the REDD decision-making 
process would be severely limited.
 
100  It is unlikely that local communities 
would have a say in the design and implementation of national REDD 
policies.  Further, REDD benefit sharing would probably be inequitable, 
with rewards piling up nationally and not trickling down to indigenous 
peoples.101  In addition, “[i]ndigenous groups are also worried that because 
they have historically served as guardians of forests—deforestation rates in 
indigenous territories are lower than in parks and unprotected areas—they 
won’t qualify for REDD payments, which reward activities that reduce 
forest clearing relative to a baseline of past deforestation.”102
Regardless of its impact on indigenous communities, the national 
approach may not be feasible in poorer countries that lack the capacity to 
monitor deforestation adequately at the national level.
 
103
b.  Sub-national Approach 
  For these 
countries, a sub-national approach may be more practical. 
Under a sub-national, or “project-level,” approach, REDD measurements 
and payments would occur in a defined geographical area or project site.104  
REDD projects could be implemented by “individuals, communities, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), private companies or national or local 
governments.”105
Because they occur on a smaller scale, sub-national REDD programs are 
easier and faster to implement than programs at the national level.  
 
 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. Costenbader, supra note 93, at 63. 
 99. See Angelsen et al., supra note 90, at 39. 
 100. Costenbader, supra note 93, at 64. 
 101. See id. (noting that adequate legal safeguards are necessary “to ensure participation 
and objective selection of projects, centralized national systems may favour elite, larger 
projects and exclude small community initiatives, raising fairness concerns and preventing 
benefits from reaching local and indigenous landholders”). 
 102. Rhett A. Butler, Brazil’s Plan to Save the Amazon, MONGABAY (June 2, 2009), 
http://news.mongabay.com/2009/0602-brazil.html. 
 103. Costenbader, supra note 93, at 62–63. 
 104. Id. at 62. 
 105. See Angelsen et al., supra note 90, at 32. 
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Additionally, the carbon market has already utilized the sub-national 
approach for various carbon-trading schemes, with relatively successful 
results.106  It may be easier for indigenous peoples to participate in the 
design and implementation of REDD at the project level as well, because 
the projects will be controlled by community laws and governance.107  On 
the other hand, decentralization of forest governance could “lead to 
increased corruption and ‘elite capture’ at local levels, as powerful groups 
with government connections dominate target communities.”108  Another 
potential risk at the sub-national level is that the goal of carbon 
sequestration will lose priority, and practices that have traditionally 
benefitted the local economy—such as deforestation—will remain 
powerful.109
c.  Nested Approach 
 
A nested, or hybrid, approach would “allow payments to go directly to 
projects that achieve reductions, and also to the national level if there is a 
proven overall reduction.”110  This is different from the national approach 
in that sub-national projects can receive direct funding, instead of being 
utilized simply to reduce national totals.  In a nested approach, the 
accounting between national and sub-national level projects would need to 
be “harmonized” so that “any emission reduction credits issued at the sub-
national level would be deducted from the national accounting.”111
Advantages to this approach include the ability to “phase” from a nested 
scale to the national scale, so that developing nations that currently lack 
resources for a national approach can utilize REDD on a smaller scale while 
building capacity for a national program.
 
112  Additionally, the nested 
approach offers flexibility, so that smaller projects can receive benefits even 
if net national deforestation emissions have not been reduced.113
4.  Financing 
 
The most crucial—and hotly debated—element of an international 
REDD scheme is financing.  The Copenhagen Accord recognizes that any 
successful REDD scheme must “provide positive incentives” for countries 
that take action to reduce deforestation and degradation.114
 
 106. Id. at 33 (noting that the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol 
“could serve as a model for the institutional set-up” of a sub-national REDD program). 
  How countries 
would receive this money, however, is still uncertain.  REDD pilot projects 
 107. See id. at 39. 
 108. Costenbader, supra note 93, at 63. 
 109. See LAWRENCE C. CHRISTY ET AL., FOREST LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:  
ADDRESSING CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES THROUGH LEGAL REFORM 86 (2007) (“Issues 
like . . . carbon sequestration are . . . likely to lose priority when there is decentralization.”). 
 110. Costenbader, supra note 93, at 63. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.  
 114. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 24, ¶ 6. 
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and proposals suggest that, similar to scope, there are three mechanisms 
through which finances could be provided:  the carbon market, a dedicated 
fund, or a hybrid of the two.115
a.  Stages of Financing 
  This section briefly explores what stages of 
financing are necessary to implement REDD, and the advantages and 
disadvantages of each financing mechanism. 
It is generally agreed that there are two phases to REDD that will need 
funding.116  The first is a capacity-building phase, also referred to as 
“readiness.”117  The capacity-building phase includes, among other 
activities, building “infrastructure for monitoring emission reductions, 
clarifying land tenure, and strengthening institutional capacities for law 
enforcement.”118
The second stage of funding “comes into play when countries have 
adequately prepared to reduce, monitor, account for, and verify emissions 
reductions.”
  This stage is essential for building a legal framework that 
can support REDD activities and ensure that REDD protects international 
obligations regarding indigenous rights. 
119  Funding at this stage includes both financing the costs of 
reducing emissions, as well as the costs of protecting the forest and 
distributing benefits and opportunity costs.120  In order to make up for a 
loss of livelihood that comes from deforestation, “[f]inancing for this stage 
of REDD will need to represent a viable and long-term alternative to the 
income generated through activities resulting in deforestation and 
degradation.”121
b.  Financing Mechanisms 
 
There are three broad proposals for REDD financing:  carbon market-
based, non-market-based, or a hybrid of the two.122  The market-based 
approach allows companies in Annex I countries to offset part of their 
emission reduction obligations by paying for avoided deforestation and 
degradation projects in developing nations.123
 
 115. See Daviet, supra note 
  This approach is similar to 
56. See generally Charlotte Streck, Financing REDD:  A 
Review of Selected Policy Proposals, WWF (Jan. 2009), http://assets.panda.org/
downloads/redd.pdf (providing an outline of REDD funding proposals submitted by ten 
countries and eight NGOs). 
 116. See Michael Dutschke et al., How Do We Match Country Needs with Financing 
Sources?, in MOVING AHEAD WITH REDD, supra note 90, at 41, 41–42. 
 117. See id. at 42. 
 118. See id.  
 119. T. Johns et al., A Three-Fund Approach to Incorporating Government, Public and 
Private Forest Stewards into a REDD Funding Mechanism, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 458, 
461 (2010). 
 120. See Dutschke et al., supra note 116, at 42. 
 121. Johns, supra note 119, at 461. 
 122. Clarke, supra note 40, at 43. 
 123. See T. Johns et al., supra note 119, at 460; see also Andrew Macintosh, Can Money 
Grow on Trees?:  Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) in 
Developing Countries, AUSTL. COUNCIL FOR INT’L DEV., 22–31 (Oct. 2010), 
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the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in the Kyoto Protocol, which 
allows Annex I countries to earn “credits” by paying for avoided 
deforestation projects in developing countries, while continuing “business 
as usual” back home.124  While the only forestry projects permitted under 
the CDM are afforestation and reforestation projects, market-based REDD 
financing would expand these benefits to avoided deforestation and 
degradation projects.125
An important restriction of market-based funding is that project 
developers can only earn credits for “additional” projects, that is, the 
emissions reduction would not otherwise have occurred.  “For forest credits 
to be traded in international carbon markets, the reductions in emissions 
must be measurable, and they must be over and above what would have 
happened otherwise.”
 
126  To make sure a REDD project is “additional,” a 
“reference level must be established, which forms the baseline against 
which the impact of programmes to reduce deforestation is measured.”127
Because of the baseline requirement in market-based funding, countries 
that do not have historically high levels of deforestation, or those who have 
already taken steps to reduce deforestation, may not benefit.
 
128  Market-
based financing is additionally criticized because it would allow the market 
to control REDD, possibly to the exclusion of local communities.  This 
possibility is greatest in countries that have a high prevalence of corruption 
and have weak forest tenure structures.129
On the other hand, the market-based approach is encouraged because it 
would likely allow for the greatest amount of funds to be raised for REDD.  
A market-based REDD scheme would encourage private investors to 
become involved with REDD by making carbon a valuable commodity and 
increasing private sector confidence.
 
130  Because of this, many believe that 
a market-based scheme is the best financing mechanism to produce enough 
money to make REDD financially viable.131
Most NGOs and indigenous peoples’ groups support a non-market based 
mechanism for funding, however, which would likely be a voluntary or 
compulsory fund created by “Annex I countries, and distributed to 
 
 
http://www.redd-monitor.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/ACFID-REDD-
report.pdf (explaining how REDD can be linked to the carbon market). 
 124. See Macintosh, supra note 123, at 15–17. 
 125. See id. 
 126. Kate Dooley, Why Congo Basin Countries Stand to Lose Out from a Market-Based 
REDD, FERN, 2 (Dec. 2009), http://www.fern.org/sites/fern.org/files/congo%20basin%
20countries%20lose%20out.pdf. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Macintosh, supra note 123, at 19. 
 129. See generally Griffiths, supra note 10 (explaining that indigenous groups are in 
danger of losing their livelihoods without seeing any financial compensation, as market-
based REDD programs do not allow for indigenous participation and frequently distribute 
finances to powerful government groups and corporations, bypassing vulnerable indigenous 
communities); see also id. at 29 (noting that market-based REDD could exacerbate poverty 
and force indigenous communities to relocate). 
 130. See MERIDIAN INST., FOSTERING CARBON MARKETS INVESTMENT IN REDD 7–8 
(2009). 
 131. See Dutschke et al., supra note 116, at 52. 
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participating developing countries to aid and reward their efforts to reduce 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.”132  This method of 
funding more closely resembles development assistance, as money comes 
from discretionary aid donors and voluntary sources, not compliance 
markets.133  A fund-based mechanism is considered to be safer and easier 
for local communities who wish to protect their forests.  This method of 
financing is better able to support REDD-capacity-building efforts, which 
must take place in a country before the REDD projects start generating 
money on the carbon market.134  Many indigenous groups fear that, absent 
fund-based financing, capacity building will be limited, and the protections 
that indigenous groups need will not be built into a REDD legal 
framework.135
Finally, there are additional proposals for financing that involve a mix 
between market- and fund-based approaches.  These so-called “hybrid” 
methods of financing could involve taxes or levies, in which a fixed 
percentage of international carbon trading schemes would be set aside for 
REDD funding.  Proponents of this method of financing state that it can 
combine the benefits of market finance with the delivery of social benefits 
to local communities.
 
136  Currently, the majority of REDD projects utilize 
fund-based mechanisms, but more and more market-based approaches are 
predicted to emerge in a few years’ time, causing many commentators to 
predict that, ultimately, both approaches will coexist.137
The environmental, economic, and social impacts of REDD ultimately 
depend upon which policy variables are selected in the international REDD 
agreement.  Because of the uncertainty surrounding REDD—and 
indigenous groups’ inability to influence REDD decisions
 
138
 
 132. T. Johns et al., supra note 
—many forest-
dwelling peoples are opposed to avoided deforestation programs.  The 
following section provides background on the interplay between indigenous 
rights and REDD, explaining where indigenous rights are found in 
international law and how those rights are upheld, or ignored, in existing 
REDD proposals.  Part I.D. also emphasizes the importance of protecting 
indigenous rights in future REDD proposals. 
119, at 460. 
 133. See David Brown et al., How Do We Achieve Co-benefits and Avoid Doing Harm?, 
in MOVING AHEAD WITH REDD, supra note 90, at 107, 110–11. 
 134. See Louis V. Verchot & Elena Petkova, The State of REDD Negotiations:  
Consensus Points, Options for Moving Forward and Research Needs to Support the Process, 
CTR. FOR INT’L FORESTRY RESEARCH, 15 (Oct. 2009), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2010/
redd_state_of_negotiations.pdf. 
 135. See generally Macintosh, supra note 123. 
 136. See Last Gasp for the Forest, ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 2009, at 93–95. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See, e.g., Griffiths, supra note 10, at 9 (noting that indigenous groups have 
repeatedly complained that they do not have adequate representation during UNFCCC 
climate negotiations, and thus are unable to impact the outcome of negotiations). 
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D.  “No Rights, No REDD”:  Indigenous Peoples’ Response to REDD 
While policymakers have agreed on the benefits of REDD programs at 
the international level, many forest-dwelling peoples are worried about the 
effects REDD will have on the ground.139  Indigenous groups in particular 
have expressed concern that by placing a price tag on trees, “REDD 
programmes could undermine some of the ecosystem services that forests 
provide locally, such as providing food, fuel and medicine to the millions of 
poor who live in and depend on the forests.”140
Indigenous groups argue that there is both a moral and practical 
imperative for emphasizing equity and protecting indigenous rights in 
REDD.
 
141  They assert that it is fundamentally unfair that REDD would 
curb development for indigenous peoples, who have contributed least to 
climate change, while allowing Annex I nations to continue business as 
usual.142  If REDD is designed without the input of forest-dwelling peoples, 
Annex I nations may be able to benefit economically and environmentally 
from indigenous groups’ loss of livelihood.143  Practically speaking, REDD 
policies will be most successful when they have the cooperation and 
support of the people who have been traditional stewards of the forests.  
Environmental NGOs and researchers agree that “‘REDD will never 
succeed . . . without the involvement of the [communities] that are making 
decisions every day as to whether to cut a tree down or leave it 
standing.’”144
Indigenous peoples have highlighted three key areas that should be 
included in REDD schemes.  First, indigenous peoples should have the right 
to participate in the REDD decision-making process, “in accordance with 
the[ir] right to free, prior and informed consent.”
 
145  Second, REDD should 
respect indigenous property rights to lands and resources, in accordance 
with international human rights instruments and obligations.146  Finally, 
REDD should “[r]ecognize the fundamental role and contribution of 
indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge, innovations and practices.”147
 
 139. See generally Griffiths, supra note 
  
10 (noting that indigenous groups have protested 
UNFCCC REDD proposals because they lack adequate safeguards for indigenous rights); 
SEYMOUR, supra note 44 (suggesting that environmental policies should be equitable and 
include indigenous input). 
 140. See Lawlor & Huberman, supra note 16, at 271. 
 141. Cf. Adianto P. Simamora, No Rights, No REDD:  Communities, JAKARTA POST (July 
1, 2010), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/07/01/no-rights-no-redd-communities.
html (quoting Abdon Nababan, the Secretary General of the Alliance of Archipelagic 
Indigenous People, who was speaking about the impact of REDD on indigenous rights in 
Indonesia). 
 142. See generally Griffiths, supra note 10. 
 143. See generally id. 
 144. Anderson, supra note 10, at 26; see also Florence Daviet et al., REDD Flags:  What 
We Need to Know About the Options, WORLD RES. INST., 2 (Dec. 2007), 
http://pdf.wri.org/redd-flags.pdf (noting that indigenous participation is “fundamental” to the 
success of any REDD program). 
 145. Fincke, supra note 29, at 5. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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Indigenous communities have warned that they will reject the 
implementation of an international REDD scheme unless it guarantees their 
rights to livelihood in the forests.148  The Secretary-General of the Alliance 
of Archipelagic Indigenous Peoples summed up a common sentiment when 
he bluntly told reporters, “Our stance is clear—no rights, no REDD.”149
1.  Indigenous Rights in International Law 
 
In 1989, the International Labour Organization’s Convention Concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO 169) was 
adopted.150  Although only ratified by twenty-two nations, ILO 169 is still 
recognized as the paramount international law guaranteeing the rights of 
indigenous peoples.151  ILO 169 “outlines the special rights of such peoples 
regarding activity on their customary lands.”152  In its parts most pertinent 
to REDD, ILO 169 grants indigenous peoples the rights to “exercise control 
. . . over their own economic, social and cultural development” and 
participate in development plans that “may affect them directly.”153  In 
addition, Article 14 guarantees that indigenous peoples’ “rights of 
ownership and possession . . . over the lands which they traditionally 
occupy shall be recognised”154 and Article 16 states that they “shall not be 
removed from the lands which they occupy.”155
Indigenous peoples’ rights were further recognized in 2007 by the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).
 
156  
Approved by the UN thirty years after it was originally introduced, 
UNDRIP builds on ILO 169 by emphasizing that parties are required to 
“grant legal title to indigenous peoples’ customary lands and to ensure their 
free, prior, and informed consent for any activity on, or their resettlement 
from, their lands.”157
 
 148. See, e.g., United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, N.Y.C., U.S., Apr. 
21–May 2, 2008, Report on the Seventh Session, ¶¶ 44–45, U.N. Doc. E/C.19/2008/13 
(2008) (stating that indigenous peoples will not support REDD policies unless they uphold 
social justice, environmental justice, and human rights). 
  While UNDRIP is not binding, it does “provide[] 
evidence of a worldwide consensus on indigenous peoples’ right to self-
 149. Simamora, supra note 141. 
 150. See International Labour Organization Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 
(June 27, 1989), Geneva, Switz., Convention 169, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/convde.pl?C169 [hereinafter ILO 169]. 
 151. See Convention No. 169, INT’L LABOUR ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/
cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C169 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) (noting that Brazil ratified ILO 169 in 
2002, but Indonesia has not ratified as of October 2011). 
 152. Lawlor & Huberman, supra note 16, at 276. 
 153. ILO 169, supra note 150, at art. 7. 
 154. Id. at art. 14. 
 155. Id. at art. 16. 
 156. See United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 
61/295, U.N. DOC A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP]. 
 157. Lawlor & Huberman, supra note 16, at 277; see also UNDRIP, supra note 156, at 
art. 26 (recognizing that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and 
resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired”). 
842 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
determination.”158  In fact, 144 nations voted that the UN should approve 
UNDRIP, while only four (Canada, New Zealand, the United States, and 
Australia) voted against the Declaration.159  All four nations have since 
reversed their decisions and signed UNDRIP.160
a.  Free, Prior, Informed Consent 
 
Both UNDRIP and ILO 169 explicitly recognize that indigenous peoples 
have a right to “free, prior and informed consent” (FPIC) regarding 
activities that directly or indirectly affect them.161  FPIC is crucial to the 
protection of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.162  “Free” 
implies that local communities should not be coerced, manipulated, or 
intimidated while making decisions.163  “Prior” means that local 
communities are contacted well before the authorization or implementation 
of any activities, and that there is sufficient time for consultation.164
nature, size, duration, pace, reversibility, scope and areas of the proposed 
activities; that they know the reasons why the project/activity is being 
proposed; and that they have access to a preliminary assessment of the 
possible economic, social and environmental impacts (including potential 
risks as well as fair and equitable benefit sharing . . .).
  
“Informed” means that indigenous peoples have knowledge of the  
165
In addition, some commentators urge that local communities should be 
able to participate in decisions that affect their livelihoods through their 
own freely chosen representatives and customary institutions.
   
166  Others 
argue that REDD processes should be carefully constructed so that FPIC is 
protected, otherwise REDD will violate international human rights 
obligations, potentially harm indigenous livelihood and self-determination, 
and create further environmental vulnerabilities.167
 
 158. Melissa Farris, Note, The Sound of Falling Trees:  Integrating Environmental 
Justice Principles into the Climate Change Framework for Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 534 (2010). 
 
 159. See UNDRIP Adopted by the General Assembly, UNITED NATIONS PERMANENT 
FORUM ON INDIGENOUS ISSUES, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/declaration.html (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
 160. See id. 
 161. See UNDRIP, supra note 156, at arts. 10, 19, 28, 29; see also ILO 169, supra note 
150, at art. 14. 
 162. See Enrique Ibarra Gené & Arif Aliadi, REDD (Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation):  Mitigation, Adaptation and the Resilience of Local 
Livelihoods 5 (Asia Sec. Initiative Policy Series, Working Paper No. 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/NTS/resources/research_papers/MacArthur%20Working%20Paper_E
nrique_and_Arif.pdf. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. (elaborating that informed “also means [indigenous groups] know who are likely 
to be involved in the execution of the proposed project (including community members, 
private sector staff, research institutions, government employees, etc.) and that they 
understand the procedures that may be involved”). 
 166. See id. 
 167. See, e.g., Fincke, supra note 29, at 5. 
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b.  The Right to Property 
In addition to being found in specific indigenous rights agreements, the 
right to hold property is identified as a general human right in both Article 
17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights168 and Article 21 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights.169  Despite the widespread 
recognition of property rights, indigenous peoples are frequently stripped of 
their ownership entitlements, due in large part to the complexities of land 
tenure systems in developing countries.170  In such systems, property rights 
frequently exist as both formally recognized statutory property rights and as 
informal customary rights.171  Overlapping systems of property rights often 
lead to legal “disputes between competing claimants,” undermining the 
security of both rights regimes.172  Indigenous peoples are especially 
vulnerable when statutory rights do not recognize customary rights because 
they largely live and work on lands that are not formally titled.173
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) has issued two 
rulings regarding the protection of customary land rights.  In 2001, the 
IACHR found that “the state must obtain consent from indigenous 
communities for activities on lands they have historically occupied and that 
the state must enact procedures to grant these communities legal title to 
their lands in order to uphold the Right to Property.”
 
174  Moreover, in the 
case of Saramaka People v. Suriname,175 the IACHR found that the right to 
property required the Suriname government to grant the Saramaka people 
legal title to their customary lands.176
 
 168. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 17 U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/3/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
  Although the court held that the 
Saramaka people have the right to own natural resources on their customary 
land, it found that the State may still restrict the “‘use of property in 
circumstances that are defined by law and that are proportionate to the 
 169. American Convention on Human Rights art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, 5 O.A.S.T.S. 36, 
1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
 170. See Gershon Feder et al., Land Tenure and Property Rights:  Theory and 
Implications for Development Policy 5 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 135 (1991). See generally 
Jeffery Hatcher, Securing Tenure Rights and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD):  Costs and Lessons Learned (Rights & Res. Initiative, Working Paper 
No. 120, 2009), available at http://www.rightsandresources.org/documents/files/
doc_1474.pdf. 
 171. See Hatcher, supra note 170, at 4. 
 172. See Annalisa Savaresi & Elisa Morgera, Ownership of Land, Forest and Carbon, in 
LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR REDD, supra note 17, at 15, 16. 
 173. See id. 
 174. Lawlor & Huberman, supra note 16, at 279. See generally Mayagna (Sumo) Awas 
Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 153 (Aug. 
31, 2001); Jonathan Vuotto, Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua:  International Precedent for 
Indigenous Land Rights? 22 B.U. INT’L L.J. 219 (2004) (providing further commentary on 
the impact of the Awas Tingni decision). 
 175. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, (Nov. 28, 2007). 
 176. See id.  
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achievement of a legitimate objective.’”177  Thus, the State may grant 
concessions on the territory to logging and mining companies.178
Along with statutory and customary ownership rights, property can also 
be classified as either private or public.  Private ownership is “generally 
characterized by rights that cannot be unilaterally extinguished by 
government, without some form of due process and compensation.”
 
179  
Both individuals and communities, such as indigenous groups, are eligible 
to own private property.180  Publicly owned land is managed directly by 
government agencies, who may allocate the land to communities or 
indigenous groups for management purposes on a “permanent or semi-
permanent basis.”181  In many developing countries, indigenous groups live 
on publicly owned land.  Thus, even if the government allocates certain 
rights over the land or resources, it may ultimately reserve the right to 
access or sell the land.182
In the context of carbon property rights, the interplay between public and 
private land rights creates multiple ownership options.  One possibility is 
that carbon rights and land rights will be intertwined, such that the owner of 
a forest is also the owner of the carbon stored inside the forest.
 
183  In this 
scenario, the sequestered carbon does not exist as a separate entitlement.  
Thus, the “forest owner could not sell or give the carbon away 
independently of the forest.”184  Alternatively, the carbon could be “subject 
to a separate, alienable property right, independent of the property of the 
forest, [so that] the owner could sell that right without conveying forest 
ownership.”185  This scenario would incorporate usufruct rights, which 
create property arrangements in which one entity may “use and derive 
benefit from property that belongs to another entity,” as long as the property 
is not impaired.186
 
 177. Lawlor & Huberman, supra note 
  Most likely, usufruct rights over sequestered carbon 
would be in the form of profit á prendre, which is a specific kind of 
easement that grants one entity the right to access a plot of land belonging 
to another entity and take biological resources that are found naturally on 
16, at 280 (quoting James Harrison, International 
Law—Significant Environmental Cases 2007-08, 20 J. ENVTL. L. 475, 481 (2008)). 
 178. See Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172. See generally Marcos A. 
Orellana, Saramaka People v. Suriname, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 841 (2008) (discussing how 
indigenous rights were changed following Saramaka). 
 179. Savaresi & Morgera, supra note 172, at 19. See generally Hatcher, supra note 170 
(explaining that private ownership is most secure, as governments and other powerful actors 
have more difficulty expropriating private land rights). 
 180. See generally LORENZO COTULA ET AL., TENURE IN REDD:  START POINT OR 
AFTERTHOUGHT? (2009) (discussing various structures of forest property rights). 
 181. Savaresi & Morgera, supra note 172, at 19. 
 182. See ANDY WHITE ET AL., WHO OWNS THE WORLD’S FORESTS?  FOREST TENURE AND 
PUBLIC FORESTS IN TRANSITION 8 (2002). 
 183. See Savaresi & Morgera, supra note 172, at 24. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See David Takacs, Forest Carbon:  Law and Property Rights, CONSERVATION INT’L,  
15 (Nov. 1, 2009), http://www.conservation.org/Documents/CI_Climate_Forest-Carbon_
Law-Property-Rights_Takacs_Nov09.pdf. 
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the land.187  Profits á prendre are generally long term rights, as opposed to 
the right to enter land just once to collect recently fallen trees.188  Thus, in 
the carbon context, it is possible that a landowner will grant profit á 
prendre to another entity, who will manage the trees for carbon 
sequestration purposes without actually owning the area.189
Additionally, “the carbon sequestered in forests may be treated as a 
publicly-owned asset, regardless of forest and land ownership.”
 
190  Even if 
a forest were privately owned, the state could declare the sequestered 
carbon as a public asset and manage the carbon (and the forest), then 
distribute benefits to the forest owners.191  In this way, the government 
would own the carbon.  In this situation, the government may have the 
power to sell the carbon, in which case it could put the benefits earned from 
the sequestered carbon into a trust for the good of either the private forest 
owners or the general public.192  Additionally, depending on national laws, 
the government might require forest owners to protect the carbon and avoid 
deforestation.193
There is a high probability that vulnerable indigenous groups will be 
further marginalized by REDD.
 
194  One primary concern is that indigenous 
peoples who have customary land rights on government land will be 
ordered to stop deforestation—thereby giving up their livelihood—and yet 
will not receive any financial benefits from the sale of sequestered 
carbon.195  In addition to indigenous concerns, prominent environmental 
economic reports emphasize the importance of a clear property rights 
framework.  For example, the Stern Review emphasizes the importance of 
property rights and argues that a clear rights structure is essential to 
effective forest management for carbon sequestration.196  Similarly, the 
Eliasch Review emphasizes that a property rights system which provides 
benefits to poor people and forest communities is necessary for the long-
term sustainability of REDD.197
 
 187. See, e.g., Karen Gould et al., Legislative Approaches to Forest Sinks in Australia 
and New Zealand:  Working Models for Other Jurisdictions?, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
FORESTS, supra note 
 
28, at 253, 253–71 (explaining that the government of New South 
Wales, Australia was the first to create a specific property right in forest carbon, and did so 
following a profit á prendre model). 
 188. See id. at 262. 
 189. See id. at 262–63. 
 190. Savaresi & Morgera, supra note 172, at 25. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 25–26. 
 193. Id. at 26. 
 194. See id.; see also William Sunderlin, Tenure:  What Will REDD Mean for Forest 
Communities?, in REDD, FOREST GOVERNANCE, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS, supra note 83, at 
31, 32 (defining “tenure” as “the right . . . that determines who can hold and use forestlands 
and resources, for how long and under what conditions,” and explaining that clearly defined 
tenure that recognizes customary rights is necessary for the protection of indigenous rights in 
REDD). 
 195. See COTULA, supra note 180, at 15–18. 
 196. See generally STERN, supra note 9. 
 197. See generally ELIASCH, supra note 9. 
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2.  Indigenous Rights (or the Lack Thereof) in REDD 
Absent uniform international guidelines, REDD country proposals and 
pilot projects are varied in their primary goals and policy practices.  
Generally speaking, however, each REDD program is guided by the “3E” 
criteria:  effectiveness, efficiency, and equity.198  Effectiveness means the 
REDD program creates significant emissions reductions, while efficiency 
asks if the reductions are being achieved at minimum cost.199  Equity looks 
at who is bearing the burden and benefits of REDD, both among and within 
nations.200  While ideally the 3Es would exist in equilibrium, many REDD 
projects view the criteria as trade-offs, rather than a balance.  In efforts to 
make REDD financially and environmentally appealing, equity is most 
frequently sacrificed.201
a.  Rights in REDD Proposals 
  This section explores both national REDD 
proposals and voluntary REDD projects in terms of how well they actualize 
the third “E” by protecting indigenous rights. 
Existing REDD proposals do not contain “explicit recognition of the 
need to respect the rights of indigenous peoples.”202  General language 
regarding indigenous rights was included in the preamble to the COP-13 
REDD decision, which states:  “[T]he needs of local and indigenous 
communities should be addressed when action is taken to reduce emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries.”203  
Indigenous parties were not satisfied, protesting that vague language placed 
in the preamble of the COP-13 agreement was not strong enough to 
adequately safeguard their rights.204  The International Forum of 
Indigenous Peoples on Climate Change adamantly protested REDD, 
claiming that it would create more violations of indigenous rights, giving 
“States and Carbon Traders control . . . over the forests.”205
 
 198. See Arild Angelson & Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff, What Are the Key Design Issues 
for REDD and the Criteria for Assessing Options?, in MOVING AHEAD WITH REDD, supra 
note 
  The 
indigenous community’s primary concern was over property rights, as they 
90, at 11, 18–21. 
 199. See id. at 18–19. 
 200. See id. at 20–21 (elaborating that equity can be measured on two levels:  within a 
single nation, equality means that REDD benefits are being fairly distributed at all levels, 
while on the international scale, equity means that all nations are able to participate in 
REDD, regardless of their wealth). 
 201. See generally Griffiths, supra note 10 (noting that because indigenous groups are not 
adequately represented in UNFCCC negotiations, REDD decisions favor the power 
players—such as big companies and governments—who are more concerned with the 
economics than the equality of REDD). 
 202. Griffiths, supra note 10, at 7. 
 203. Bali Roadmap, supra note 51, at pmbl. 
 204. See Statement by the International Forum of Indigenous Peoples on Climate Change 
(IFIPCC) on ‘Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation’ (REDD) 
Agenda Item at the UNFCCC Climate Negotiations, FOREST PEOPLES PROGRAMME (Nov. 1, 
2007), http://www.forestpeoples.org/topics/un-framework-convention-climate-change-
unfccc/news/2011/05/statement-international-forum-indi.  
 205. Id. 
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worried that they would lose access to their customary lands and 
resources.206  Additionally, indigenous peoples stated the need for 
improved participation in UNFCCC deliberations, arguing that they should 
be included in intergovernmental decisions that will directly affect 
indigenous rights and livelihood.207
In 2008, eight Amazonian countries signed The Manaus Declaration and 
Areas of Consensus and Disagreement to “ensure the full exercise of the 
sovereign rights of the Amazon countries over the resources of the region’s 
biological diversity.”
 
208  Signatories to the Manaus Declaration agreed that 
REDD projects must “recognise the capability of sustainable management 
of forests as exercised by indigenous peoples and traditional communities, 
as well as the historical role of these peoples and communities in the 
conservation and in the equilibrium of global climate to develop a 
compensation system.”209
Although indigenous activists stressed that there must be a stronger 
commitment to protect rights and equity in future Convention agreements, 
the Copenhagen Accord did not contain any specific safeguards of 
indigenous rights.
 
210  The lack of rights protection was part of the reason 
that the COP-15 did not yield an agreement, as some countries refused to 
support an agreement that did not reference indigenous rights.211  COP-16’s 
Cancun Accord is credited for including rights safeguards because it 
requests that each country develop a system to track rights protection before 
implementing REDD programs.212  While this is seen as a big step towards 
ensuring that REDD respects indigenous rights, the Accord’s language does 
not contain specific details for the implementation of a rights-tracking 
system.213  For example, there is no guidance regarding what information 
must be collected, how the information will be shared, or for what 
purpose.214
 
 206. See generally Climate Change, Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples, INT’L INDIAN 
TREATY COUNCIL (2008), http://www.treatycouncil.org/PDF/HR%20IPS%20and%20
Climate%20Change%20corrfinal122708OHCHRa.pdf. 
  Further, the Accord does not name any intergovernmental 
 207. See generally id. 
 208. See Mario Osava, The Manaus Declaration:  8 Countries Assert Sovereignty over 
the Amazon Rainforest, MONGABAY, http://www.mongabay.com/external/ACTO.htm (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
 209. Lawlor & Huberman, supra note 16, at 273 (internal quotations omitted). 
 210. See Fincke, supra note 29, at 6 (noting that COP agreements reference human rights 
documents but do not provide explicit guidelines to protect human rights). 
 211. See Press Release, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Bolivia Decries Adoption of 
Copenhagen Accord II Without Consensus (Dec. 11, 2010), available at 
http://pwccc.files.wordpress.com/2010/12/press-release-history-will-be-the-judge.pdf 
(claiming that Bolivia opposed both the Copenhagen and Cancun Accords because they did 
not adequately protect indigenous communities against rights abuses); see also Bodansky, 
supra note 23, at 231 (noting that Bolivia and Venezuela led a small group of nations in 
opposition against the Copenhagen Accord). 
 212. See Cancun Accord, supra note 61, § III(c)(72); see also Climate Change 
Diplomacy, supra note 63.  
 213. See Cancun Accord, supra note 61, § III(c)(72); see also Austin, supra note 74 
(providing further commentary on which safeguards are absent from international REDD 
agreements). 
 214. See Cancun Accord, supra note 61, § III(c)(72). 
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institution that would help gather information and determine if adequate 
rights safeguards are in place.215
b.  Indigenous Rights in Voluntary REDD Projects 
 
While the UNFCCC agreements don’t explicitly safeguard indigenous 
rights, international standards within the voluntary carbon market require 
certain rights protections before REDD pilot projects will be approved.216  
Because an international REDD regime has not yet been established, 
current REDD projects exist within a voluntary system which has 
developed its own rules to regulate REDD.217  Voluntary REDD projects 
must meet certain standards in order to receive certification, which 
promotes the project’s legitimacy and makes it more attractive to 
investors.218  The international community has consolidated around a select 
number of standards that are expected to “shape the ‘law’ governing 
voluntary forest carbon schemes.”219
i.  Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Standards 
  This section focuses on two standards 
that promote the community benefits (as opposed to the monitoring and 
verification efficiency) of REDD projects—the Community, Climate, and 
Biodiversity Alliance (CCB) and the Forest Carbon Partnership Fund. 
For assessing the broader social and environmental impacts of projects, 
the CCB Standards dominate.220  The CCB Alliance is a conglomerate of 
international NGOs and research institutions that developed voluntary 
standards to help ensure that REDD projects create a sustainable 
environment while allowing indigenous peoples to maintain a sustainable 
lifestyle.221  The CCB Alliance promotes its standards as a catch-all, 
applicable to both government-led and voluntary REDD programs, 
regardless of whether they are implemented at a national or regional level, 
or financed through funds or the carbon market.222
 
 215. See id. 
  Different from other 
voluntary standards that regulate accounting mechanisms, the CCB 
standards aim to “ensur[e] that there are net community and biodiversity 
 216. See Overview:  Forest Carbon Standards in the Voluntary Market, CARBON 
POSITIVE, http://116.12.48.151/viewarticle.aspx?articleID=1433 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) 
(providing descriptions of the main standards regulating the voluntary carbon market, 
including the Voluntary Carbon Standards, which provide guidelines for carbon 
measurement and verification, and the Community, Climate, and Biodiversity Standards, 
which provide regulations regarding the social impacts of REDD). 
 217. See Nina Chestney, Forestry Gains Momentum in Voluntary Carbon Market, 
REUTERS, (Sept. 28, 2010, 12:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE68R3IR20100928. 
 218. See id. 
 219. Takacs, supra note 186, at 24. 
 220. See id. 
 221. Home, CLIMATE, COMMUNITY AND BIODIVERSITY ALLIANCE, http://www.climate-
standards.org/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
 222. See id. 
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benefits to a planned [REDD] project.”223  Because they focus on co-
benefits, rather than accounting mechanisms, the CCB standards are 
frequently used in conjunction with other voluntary standards that are more 
measurement-focused.224
The CCB Standards are used to certify REDD schemes at the project 
level, independent of national REDD programs.  A third-party auditor will 
evaluate each project that has applied to be CCB certified.  In an effort to 
keep costs manageable and to have credible evaluators, the CCB Alliance 
“may authorize certifiers already approved by the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism, the California Climate Action Registry, [or 
other] existing forest certification programs.”
 
225  The Standards are 
separated into four sections:  general, climate, community, and biodiversity.  
To be approved, a REDD project must fulfill the fifteen required standards, 
which include “Net Positive Community Impacts,” “Community Impact 
Monitoring,” and “Land Tenure” evaluation.226  There are also a number of 
“optional” standards that, if met, would elevate the REDD project to 
“Silver” or “Gold” certification.227  REDD capacity building is one of these 
optional criteria.228
The CCB Standards have received positive feedback from NGOs that 
represent indigenous groups, who have reported that “‘CCB Standards 
are . . . extremely important as a means to safeguard and promote the 
interest of . . . often marginalized groups.’”
 
229
ii.  World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Fund 
  Because the Standards are 
relatively new, however, their long-term ability to protect indigenous rights 
in a REDD regime remains untested. 
The World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Fund (FCPF) aims to 
“assist Eligible REDD Countries in their efforts to achieve emission 
reductions . . . by providing them with financial and technical assistance in 
building their capacity to benefit from . . . future systems of positive 
incentives for REDD.”230
 
 223. See Rules for the Use of the Climate, Community & Biodiversity Standards, 
CLIMATE, COMMUNITY AND BIODIVERSITY ALLIANCE, 3 (June 21, 2010), 
http://www.scscertified.com/docs/CCB_Standards_Rules_062110.pdf. 
  Unlike the project-based CCB standards, the 
 224. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 24 (noting that the Voluntary Carbon Standard and 
the Clean Development Mechanism are voluntary standards that focus on accounting 
mechanisms in REDD, and can be used simultaneously with the CCB Standards). 
 225. Climate, Community and Biodiversity Project Design Standards, CLIMATE, 
COMMUNITY AND BIODIVERSITY ALLIANCE, 5 (Oct. 2005), http://www.climate-standards.org/
images/pdf/CCBStandards.pdf. 
 226. Id. at 6–7. 
 227. Id. at 7. 
 228. Id.  
 229. New Standards Ensure Forest Carbon Projects Protect Indigenous People, 
Biodiversity, MONGABAY (Dec. 8, 2008), http://news.mongabay.com/2008/1208-ccba.html 
(quoting Charles Ehrhart, head of the Climate Change Program at CARE International). 
 230. Charter Establishing the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, INT’L BANK FOR 
RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., May 11, 2011, at 11, available at 
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FCPF works at the national level, helping countries become better equipped 
to adopt REDD programs.231  In October 2008, over forty developing 
nations expressed interest in working with the FCPF.232
There are two FCPF funds—a Readiness Fund and a Carbon Fund—
which are implemented in stages.  While the Carbon Fund will help with 
developing the carbon market once the REDD project has been 
implemented, the Readiness phase focuses on capacity building before 
REDD begins.
 
233  The Readiness Fund aims to protect indigenous 
communities by developing guidelines for national legal frameworks, such 
as property rights, community involvement, and local governance.234  
Countries interested in participating must submit a Readiness Plan Idea 
Note (R-PIN) to the FCPF.235  If approved, the country will receive grants 
to assist with REDD planning.  Unlike the CCB Standards, capacity 
building is mandatory before a project can receive further FCPF funding 
and approval.236
The FCPF claims to be “inclusive of all the stakeholders and rights-
holders in the forest sector.”
 
237  Even so, the FCPF has been maligned by 
indigenous groups for “violating its own rules” and failing to safeguard 
indigenous rights, most importantly the right to FPIC.238  The FCPF was 
criticized in 2007 for prematurely launching REDD pilot projects in an 
effort to have data ready to present at COP-13 in Bali.239  As a result, the 
FCPF implemented a “rushed design” and did not properly consult with 
indigenous groups.240
 
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Document
s/PDF/May2011/FCPF%20Charter%20-%20CF%2005-11-2011%20clean.pdf. 
  In addition, the FCPF has faced criticism for 
 231. See Kate Dooley et al., Cutting Corners:  World Bank’s Forest and Carbon Fund 
Fails Forests and Peoples, FERN, 5 (Nov. 2008), http://www.fern.org/sites/fern.org/files/
document%20cutting%20corners.pdf. 
 232. See Crystal Davis et al., A Review of 25 Readiness Plan Idea Notes from the World 
Bank Carbon Partnership Facility 1 (World Res. Inst., Working Paper, 2009), available at 
http://pdf.wri.org/world_bank_readiness_review.pdf (providing a detailed analysis of 25 
countries that have already started to work with FCPF). 
 233. See Background Analysis of REDD Regulatory Frameworks, supra note 80, at 82. 
 234. See id. at 82–83. 
 235. See Davis et al., supra note 232, at 1 (noting that the first step for developing 
countries who wish to reduce deforestation and access World Bank funds is an R-PIN). 
 236. See id. 
 237. FCPF Brochure, FOREST CARBON PARTNERSHIP FACILITY, at 16 (2009), available at 
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Document
s/PDF/Sep2010/New%20FCPF%20brochure%20--%20low%20resolution%20051809_0.pdf.  
The FCPF General Information Memorandum states:  “[I]t is important that these actors 
participate early on in the readiness process.  Countries will . . . make special efforts to 
ensure that forest-dependent indigenous peoples and other forest dwellers meaningfully 
participate in decisions that may affect them and that their rights are respected.”  Information 
Memorandum, FOREST CARBON PARTNERSHIP FACILITY, 4–5 (June 13, 2008), 
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/
Documents/PDF/FCPF_Info_Memo_06-13-08.pdf. 
 238. Griffiths, supra note 10, at 11–12. See generally Dooley et al., supra note 231. 
 239. See Mrinalini Rai, REDD and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:  Ensuring Equity 
and Participation in World Bank Funds, BRETTON WOODS PROJECT (Apr. 17 2009), 
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-564322. 
 240. Id. 
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allowing countries with underdeveloped R-PINs to receive REDD 
funding.241
II.  REDD RAMIFICATIONS:  THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF REDD              
IN BRAZIL AND INDONESIA 
 
Although REDD standards in the voluntary carbon market have helped 
make rights protection an expected norm, the standards do not have the 
same persuasive power as national law.  As indicated by the Cancun 
Accord, however, national legal frameworks will play a key role in the 
practical implementation of REDD, and will directly affect rights protection 
in each country.242
As the international community focuses on which policy practices would 
be most effective in a global REDD regime, the legal consequences of 
REDD design and implementation mechanisms have received less 
attention.
  Part II compares the legal frameworks of Brazil and 
Indonesia, analyzing how existing forestry legislation and new REDD-
specific regulations protect indigenous rights in REDD. 
243  Legal clarity, especially at the national level, will be essential 
to the success of REDD projects, which must coexist with laws and 
regulations governing investment, taxes, property, and forestry—to name a 
few.244
REDD can either be integrated into existing national law or be the 
impetus for new laws that prevent deforestation.
  Regardless of international REDD agreements, national law will 
ultimately dictate how REDD is implemented on the ground, thereby 
determining how REDD will affect the lives of forest-dwelling peoples. 
245  National constitutions, 
for example, frequently have broad environmental protection provisions 
that can be used as the foundation for REDD.246  Additionally, REDD can 
be incorporated into existing environmental law, such as a national 
environmental policy act or regulations that specifically govern the forestry 
sector.247  If preexisting laws will not adequately implement REDD, 
however, countries can create specific laws or regulations to “cover REDD 
comprehensively.”248
 
 241. See Davis et al., supra note 
  Most likely, it will be necessary both to create new 
232, at 2–3; see also Chris Lang, Review of World Bank 
Approved R-PINs Finds Critical Issues Are Conspicuously Missing, REDD-MONITOR (Mar. 
12, 2009), http://www.redd-monitor.org/2009/03/12/world-resources-institute-review-of-
world-bank-approved-r-pins-finds-critical-issues-are-conspicuously-missing/ (noting that 
adequate tenure clarity, law enforcement, and monitoring mechanisms were missing from 
many of the approved R-PINs). 
 242. See Cancun Accord, supra note 61, § III(C), ¶¶ 68–79 (requesting that, before 
undertaking REDD activities, each country develops a national REDD plan, a national 
reference emission level, a national forest monitoring system, and a system to address 
safeguards for indigenous peoples’ rights). 
 243. See id. 
 244. See Costenbader, supra note 93, at 4–5 (noting that other legal areas that should be 
considered include investment law, tax law, and monitoring, reporting, and verification of 
REDD projects). 
 245. See id. at 11–13. 
 246. See id. 
 247. See id. 
 248. See id. at 12. 
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laws and integrate REDD into the preexisting legal framework, because 
constitutional provisions should be accompanied by new legislation 
detailing how to implement REDD, and independent laws must be in 
accordance with the established constitution.249
This Part compares the legal frameworks of Brazil and Indonesia, the 
worldwide leaders in deforestation.  After giving a general overview of the 
governance structure and deforestation challenges in each nation, this Part 
specifically focuses on the laws and regulations regarding forest carbon 
ownership, REDD financing, and benefit distribution. 
 
A.  Brazil 
Encompassing 477,698,000 ha,250 Brazil’s forests sequester more carbon 
than those of any other nation.251  Deforestation is rampant in Brazil, 
however, and accounts for approximately three-quarters of the country’s 
annual carbon emissions.252  Seventeen percent of the Amazon has already 
been lost,253 and some scientists predict that 55 percent will be destroyed 
by 2030 unless “something dramatic” occurs.254  Scientists and 
policymakers have identified an aggressive REDD scheme as the step that 
Brazil must take to save its rainforests.255
At the international level, Brazil has been an active participant in 
UNFCCC REDD negotiations.  At COP-12 in Nairobi (2006), Brazil added 
a new proposal to the REDD discourse, suggesting that REDD provide 
“positive incentives for voluntary action” to reduce deforestation in 
developing countries.
 
256
 
 249. See id. at 11–13. 
  Instead of following the proposal put forth by the 
Coalition of Rainforest Nations—which would allow Annex I nations to use 
REDD as an “offset” option to meet mandatory emissions reductions 
targets—Brazil’s proposal advocates a voluntary fund, in which Annex I 
nations would make performance-based donations, in addition to meeting 
 250. Brazil Statistics, MONGABAY, http://rainforests.mongabay.com/deforestation/archive/
Brazil.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
 251. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 34. 
 252. See Griffiths, supra note 10, at 3; see also Osvaldo Stella Martins et al., Brazil, in 
REDD, FOREST GOVERNANCE AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS, supra note 83, at 53, 55 (noting that 
key drivers of deforestation in Brazil are agribusiness—including grain production and 
conversion of forests to pastureland—cattle ranching, timber extraction and mining); Rhett 
A. Butler, Big REDD, WASH. MONTHLY (July–Aug. 2009), 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2009/0907.butler.html (explaining that 
deforestation in Brazil peaked between 1997 and 2004 at 10,600 square miles per year, an 
area the size of Massachusetts). 
 253. See The Juma Sustainable Development Reserve Project:  Reducing Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions for Deforestation in the State of Amazonas, Brazil, 5 (May 7, 2008),  
http://www.climate-standards.org/projects/files/pdd_juma_project_v_3_0.pdf [hereinafter 
Juma PDD]. 
 254. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 34. 
 255. See id. 
 256. See 12th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Nairobi, Kenya, Nov. 6–17, 2006, Submission from Brazil, add. 5, U.N. 
DOC FCCC/CP/2006/5/Add. (Jan. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil Submission]. 
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their mandatory targets, to reward developing countries that have reduced 
deforestation.257
Domestically, Brazil has implemented sixteen voluntary REDD programs 
as of 2009,
 
258 and has been developing a legal framework for REDD.259  
Brazil faces two primary challenges with its internal REDD initiation.  
First, because it is a federation, Brazil must be aware of the interplay 
between national and state forestry laws.260  Additionally, Brazil must 
navigate a complex system of land rights that uses both customary and 
statutory law.261
1.  Forest Governance in a Federation 
  Because of these challenges—and the diverse solutions 
Brazil is testing in its pilot projects—Brazil’s legal framework presents an 
interesting study of how to implement REDD regulations and rewards 
across a multi-layered nation. 
Brazil looks to a number of policies, regulations, and laws—both at the 
national and state level—to establish the legal basis for REDD initiation.262  
Brazil has used federalism to its benefit while implementing REDD pilot 
projects, allowing for varied policies to be tested under differing state 
laws.263  Even so, as Brazil prepares for a binding international REDD 
agreement, it faces the difficulty of managing a “complex mix of federal 
and state laws on climate and forestry” which complicate REDD 
application.264
At the national level, Brazil’s government has not enacted any legislation 
to govern REDD activities specifically.
  This section outlines the national and local regulations that 
create the legal framework for Brazil’s REDD programs. 
265  Instead, the government looks to 
existing forestry laws to regulate REDD.  The most prominant of these laws 
is the Federal Constitution of Brazil, which recognizes the importance of 
cohesion between the multiple levels of government, especially in regards 
to climate conservation.266
 
 257. See id.; see also CHARLIE PARKER ET AL., THE LITTLE REDD+ BOOK 38 (2009) 
(highlighting how Brazil’s UNFCCC proposal differs from other national REDD proposals); 
Streck, supra note 
  The Constitution emphasizes that both the 
national government and local communities have a duty to preserve the 
115, at 11–12, 15 (describing Brazil and Costa Rica’s financial 
proposals). 
 258. See Marie Calmel et al., REDD at Project Scale+:  Evaluation and Development 
Guide, ONF INT’L, 25 (2009), http://www.onfinternational.org/images/stories/information/
publications/guide_redd_eng.pdf. 
 259. Émilie Champagne & Josh Roberts, Case Study:  Brazil, in LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR 
REDD, supra note 17, at 125, 125. 
 260. See id. 
 261. See id. 
 262. See id. at 126. See generally S. Schwartzman, Brazil National and State REDD 
Report, ENVTL. DEF. FUND (Nov. 2009), http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/
10438_Brazil_national_and_state_REDD_report.pdf (discussing the national and state laws 
that must coexist for a successful REDD regime in Brazil). 
 263. See Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 126. 
 264. See Costenbader, supra note 73, at 14. 
 265. See Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 126. 
 266. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 23 (Braz.), available at 
http://www.v-brazil.com/government/laws/constitution.html. 
854 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
environment.267  It is the responsibility of the “Union, the States, the 
Federal District and the municipalities to . . . protect the environment and 
fight pollution in any of its forms [and] to preserve the forests, fauna, and 
flora.”268
Building on the general duties outlined in the Constitution, Brazil’s 
national government has introduced two overarching plans to fight climate 
change and deforestation:  The National Plan to Combat Deforestation and 
Plan to Combat Deforestation at State Level for the Period 2008–2011
 
269 
(Deforestation Plan) and the National Plan on Climate Change270
The National Plan presents Brazil’s strategy for curbing climate change, 
setting the nation’s first deforestation reduction target, which uses a series 
of reduction goals to ultimately cut deforestation 70 percent by 2018.
 (National 
Plan). 
271  
The National Plan envisions using forest monitoring and protection 
mechanisms, combined with an incentives program, to halt deforestation.272  
Thus, while its goal is to reduce deforestation and forest degradation, the 
National Plan does not use traditional REDD methodologies, such as 
generating carbon credits, in order to do so.273  Specific measures call for 
sanctions on illegal logging, a forest restoration program, and the 
establishment of a National Public Forests Register to keep track of the 
protection and management of public forests.  In addition, the National Plan 
advocates the use of a satellite to monitor deforestation in the Amazon.274
The Deforestation Plan delineates both national and state level plans to 
enhance environmental law enforcement and improve land-titling 
procedures in the Amazon Basin.
 
275
 
 267. Id. art. 20. 
  The Deforestation Plan enacts a 
number of measures to combat deforestation, including improved forest 
monitoring and management, and setting aside 20 million ha as 
 268. Id. art. 23. 
 269. Decreto No. 6.321, de 3 Novembro 2007, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
12.2008 (Braz.); see also SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 262, at 1 (noting that the Deforestation 
Plan is an updated version of a high profile law from 2003, entitled the “Action Plan”). 
 270. Decreto No. 6.263, de 3 Novembro 2007, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
12.2008 (Braz.). 
 271. Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 126; see also Pedro Piris-Cabezas & 
Ruben Lubowski, The Brazilian National Plan on Climate Change:  Potential Impacts in a 
US Cap-and-Trade System, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, 1 (Nov. 29, 2009), http://cleartheair.edf.org/
documents/10563_Brazilian_national_plan_on_climate_change.pdf (noting that the National 
Plan calls for a phased approach to emissions reductions, with deforestation being reduced 
40 percent from 2006–09, and then decrease by another 30 percent every four years until 
2017, at which point emissions will have been reduced 71 percent below then 1996–2005 
national reference level). 
 272. Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 126. 
 273. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 34; cf. Brazil’s Climate Change Plan ‘Ready for 
Public Scrutiny,’ GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/
oct/08/network.conservation (noting that emissions reductions targets will be met by 
promotion of sustainable agriculture practices). 
 274. See Griffiths, supra note 10, at 49. 
 275. See Background Analysis of REDD Regulatory Frameworks, supra note 80, at 50–51 
(noting that while the Deforestation Plan aimed to address deforestation at its roots, the 
success of the program has yet to be felt in the Amazon). 
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conservation units.276  In addition, the Deforestation Plan specifically 
emphasizes the importance of decentralized forest management, with 
partnerships between federal, state, and local governments “and the 
establishment of a legal framework for public forest management.”277
In addition to these two prominent plans, Brazil has adopted Federal Law 
11.284 on the Management of Public Forests.
 
278  This law promises an 
allocation of land and resources to be managed by local communities, 
discussed in further detail in Part II.A.3, which addresses Brazil’s land 
ownership laws.  In addition, the law states that it is forbidden to develop a 
forestry plan that “commercializ[es] credits derived from avoided emissions 
of carbon in existing forests.”279  Despite this provision, the Federal law 
reserves for the states the right to use a commercial carbon market, which is 
also consistent with Brazil’s international REDD position.280
At the sub-national level, the State of Amazonas has been most active in 
passing climate change laws.  In 2007, the Law for the State Policy for 
Climate Change was the first state-level climate change law to be passed in 
Brazil.
 
281  This law created a climate change fund “to pay for 
environmental products and services, including those provided by forest 
peoples preserving their environment and reducing deforestation,” and 
established financial incentives for conservation projects in Amazonas.282  
Departing from the national stance, the Amazonas state law specifically 
supports endeavors by the private sector to use market principles in order to 
offset their emissions.283  The law gives clear guidelines for how REDD 
project benefits should be distributed, along with mandating measurements 
of carbon, protection of forest biodiversity, and baseline levels of GHG 
emissions from various economic sectors.284
2.  Brazil’s Plan for Fund-Based Financing 
  As indicated by the 
Amazonas state law, the state and national governments in Brazil differ 
regarding their approaches to financing REDD.  Part II.A.2. addresses the 
financing proposal put forward by Brazil’s national government. 
The Brazilian national government bluntly opposed any REDD scheme 
that would be linked to the carbon market, and has “repeatedly rejected 
REDD policies and projects that would offset emissions from industrialized 
 
 276. See id. 
 277. See id. at 51. 
 278. Decreto No. 11.284, de 2 de Março 2006, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
3.3.2006 (Braz.); see also Brazil Public Forest Management Law of 2006, USDA FOREIGN 
AGRICULTURAL SERVICE GAIN REPORT (Apr. 11, 2006), www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/
200605/146197843.pdf. 
 279. See Background Analysis of REDD Regulatory Frameworks, supra note 80, at 53.  
 280. See id. 
 281. Lei no. 3.135, de 4 de Junho de 2007, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO ESTADO DO AMAZONAS 
[D.O.A.]. 
 282. Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 129. 
 283. See id. 
 284. Id. 
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. . . countries.”285  Instead of supporting market-based financing for REDD, 
where credits generated from forest conservation would be traded between 
countries, Brazil advocates the establishment of a voluntary REDD fund 
that would be filled with donations from industrialized countries.286  This 
fund would be completely independent of mandatory emissions reductions 
targets, so Annex I nations could not use their donations to offset emission 
reduction obligations under a binding climate treaty.287  The Environment 
Minister of Brazil issued a public statement announcing that “[f]or Brazil, 
the efforts made by Developing Countries in order to mitigate climate 
change through the forest sector need to be additional to the efforts 
provided by Developed Countries to reduce its emissions.”288
Brazil has created the Amazon Fund to encourage reforestation and other 
sustainable activities in the Amazon.
 
289  Brazil envisions that the 
international community will make payments into the fund based on 
“demonstrable reductions in emissions from deforestation in the previous 
year against a national reference baseline.”290  Thus far, Brazil’s federal 
government has pledged $500 million for the fund,291 and the Government 
of Norway has committed $1 billion, to be paid from 2008 to 2015.292  
Brazil hopes that the fund will generate close to $21 billion to help combat 
deforestation in the Amazon.293
The Amazon Fund is managed by the Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES), and stakeholders include representatives from BNDES as well as 
local and national government agencies, indigenous groups, and civil 
society.
 
294  The Fund will issue grants for forest conservation projects, 
contingent upon the project’s fulfillment of five general criteria.  To be 
eligible for funding, a project must promote the sustainable use of forests, 
provide for land tenure and territory planning, respect public forests and 
protected areas, stimulate the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity, and aid in the recovery of deforested areas.295
 
 285. See Griffiths, supra note 
  As of 
10, at 7. 
 286. See Butler, supra note 102. 
 287. Id. 
 288. See Griffiths, supra note 10, at 49 (quoting Marina Silver, the Brazilian Minister of 
the Environment, speaking at the Midnight Sun Dialogue on Climate Change in Sweden, 
June 11–14, 2008). 
 289. See, e.g., As the Amazon Goes, So Goes the Planet, AMAZON FUND, 
http://www.amazonfund.org/index.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2011); see also Takacs, supra 
note 186, at 34. 
 290. See Griffiths, supra note 10, at 49. 
 291. See id. 
 292. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 34; see also Daniel Nepstad et al., The End of 
Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, 326 SCIENCE 1350, 1350–51 (2009) (noting that the 
significant international contributions to the Amazon Fund create a big opportunity for 
Brazil to end deforestation practices in the Amazon). 
 293. See Joshua Goodman, Brazil Creates $21 Billion Fund to Slow Amazon 
Deforestation, BLOOMBERG ONLINE (Aug. 1 2008, 4:45 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid =ahDbiZfuCxZI&refer=latin_america. 
 294. See Griffiths, supra note 10, at 49. 
 295. See generally SIMON ZADEK ET AL., THE AMAZON FUND:  RADICAL SIMPLICITY AND 
BOLD AMBITION (Avina, Working Paper, 2010), available at 
2011] THE “RIGHT” REDD FRAMEWORK 857 
November 2010, eight projects, worth a total of $60 million, have been 
approved for Amazon funding.296
While Brazil’s international and national stance has been adamantly 
against the carbon market, at the state level, new climate change laws 
support the use of linking REDD with carbon credits.
 
297  The State of 
Amazonas takes full advantage of the provision in the Federal Law on the 
Management of Public Forests, which preserves the states’ right to utilize 
the carbon market.298  The Law for the State Policy for Climate Change in 
Amazonas promotes the use of market instruments in REDD schemes.299  
However, the Amazonas Law also includes a state climate change fund to 
pay for environmental services, such as avoiding deforestation.300
3.  Ownership of Forests and Forest Carbon 
 
The Brazilian national government does not currently recognize specific 
property rights in carbon.  It is generally “presumed (but not legally 
explicit) that whoever owns the rights to use the land above ground would 
also have rights to the carbon.”301  While the government discourages 
carbon trading on national land, it does allow for carbon market projects on 
state and privately owned land.302  Thus, one of Brazil’s biggest difficulties 
in establishing a clear legal framework for REDD is to overcome the 
“complex layers of regulation and uncertainty over land ownership in the 
Amazon [that] pose great challenges for the implementation of future 
REDD projects in Brazil.”303
Brazil’s Constitution guarantees the right to property, and establishes that 
private land ownership is permitted.
 
304  Brazil does not have a central land 
register, however, making it difficult for Brazilians to claim land 
formally.305  Thus, only an estimated four percent of private land in 
Amazonia is covered by secure title.306  In an effort to clarify land 
ownership, the national government has enacted a new law to “regularize” 
land holdings of up to 1,500 ha.307
 
http://www.brazilworks.org/files/Amazon-Fund_Radical-Simplicity-and-Bold-Ambition_
Working-Paper_November2010.pdf. 
  Federal Law 11.925, adopted in 2009, 
allows squatters to become regularized occupants of public lands located in 
 296. See id. at 12. 
 297. See Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 129. 
 298. See id. 
 299. See id. 
 300. See Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 129. 
 301. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 35. See generally THIAGO CHAGAS, FOREST CARBON 
RIGHTS IN BRAZIL (2010) (noting that, absent specific property rights in carbon, REDD 
programs in Brazil cannot guarantee protection of indigenous property rights). 
 302. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 35. 
 303. See Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 125. 
 304. See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5 (Braz.), available at 
http://www.v-brazil.com/government/laws/constitution.html. 
 305. See Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 127. 
 306. See id. 
 307. Lei No. 11.925, de 17 de Abril de 2009, DIÁRIO ORICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
4.17.2009 (Braz.). 
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rural Brazil.308  The government will donate plots of up to 100 ha (247 
acres) to land occupants who meet a number of requirements, including that 
the land occupation began prior to December 1, 2004; occupants use the 
land for agriculture; and occupants hold the land for at least three years 
before selling it.309
Although the law aims to “encourage . . . occupants to stay and improve 
their land instead of abandoning it and moving on to clear the next patch of 
virgin forest,” it has been criticized for potentially stimulating land 
grabbing.
 
310  “[B]y making it easier to get secure title for dubious land 
claims,” the law may prompt a demand for land and encourage squatting in 
the hopes that it might lead to de facto ownership.311  In addition, the law’s 
productive use requirements have been denounced because they encourage 
deforestation practices, causing critics to worry that even if the law clarifies 
land title, it may do so at the expense of the forest.312
On private land, a landowner has the power to decide when to grant 
concessions, and a landowner’s permission is required before anyone else 
can use natural resources.
 
313  However, all rural properties are subject to 
two governmental limitations that are codified in the Brazilian Forestry 
Code.314  First, Permanent Preservation Areas may be demarcated on either 
public or private land that has important environmental functions.315  
Second, owners of forestland must designate 80 percent of their plot as a 
Reserva Legal (Legal Reserve), which can only be improved after the 
government authorizes a sustainable management plan.316
Public lands are administered in accordance with the Law on the 
Management of Public Lands, which designates that the Union, states, or 
municipalities must allocate concessions on the land “in the interest of the 
common good.”
 
317
According to the Brazilian Constitution, all indigenous land is technically 
the property of the federal government; however, Article 231 recognizes 
that indigenous groups have a right to “permanent possession” of the land 
that they traditionally occupy, and have “exclusive rights over the riches of 
  The law guarantees that certain areas of the forest must 
be managed by local communities. 
 
 308. Id. 
 309. See Savaresi & Morgera, supra note 172, at 20 (noting that the Brazilian government 
will also sell larger plots of land (i.e., between 100–400 ha) for a reduced price, provided 
that the same criteria are met). 
 310. The Brazilian Amazon:  Preventing Pillage in the Rainforest, ECONOMIST, Feb. 26, 
2009, at 39. 
 311. Id. 
 312. See Savaresi & Morgera, supra note 172, at 20. 
 313. See Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 130–31. 
 314. Lei No. 4.771, de 15 de Setembro de 1965, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
16.9.1965 (Braz.). 
 315. See id.; see also Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 127–28. 
 316. See Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 127–28. 
 317. See id. 
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the soil, the rivers and the lakes existing therein.”318  In order to ensure that 
its land rights are protected, an indigenous group must apply to be formally 
recognized by the Fundaçao Nacional do Indio (FUNAI).319  Once the 
recognition process is complete, the indigenous group has the “exclusive 
right to use all the goods on the land, even though the land itself continues 
to belong to the state.”320  In this manner, indigenous property rights 
become an usufruct right, allowing an indigenous group to use the “natural 
wealth of their lands to sustain them and preserve their cultural identity.”321
Alternatively, indigenous groups can apply to have their lands be 
designated as national reserves or protected areas.
 
322  To do so, an 
indigenous group would again submit an application to FUNAI, which 
would then perform an anthropological study and issue a statement to the 
Justice Department, recommending whether or not the claim should be 
accepted.323  If the recommendation is positive, the Justice Department will 
order the demarcation of a reserve, thereby granting formal legal protection 
to the indigenous group.324  Currently, “indigenous reserves comprise about 
20% of the Brazilian Amazon, and . . . are, on average, much better 
conserved than those outside of reserves and protected areas.”325
4.  Benefit Distribution 
 
At the national level, there is no legal framework for benefit sharing in 
REDD projects.326  State level REDD programs, however, have utilized 
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) as a way to reward forest-
dwellers for not cutting down their trees.327
 
 318. See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 231 (Braz.), available at 
http://www.v-brazil.com/government/laws/constitution.html (recognizing that indigenous 
peoples have customary ownership rights on Brazilian lands and natural resources). 
  PES is a voluntary transaction 
wherein a well-defined environmental service is purchased by a buyer from 
 319. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 35; see also Tom Gibb, Brazil Authorizes Indian 
Reserve, BBC (Apr. 15, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4450755.stm (reporting 
that Brazil set aside an area of 17,000 square kilometers as an indigenous reserve). 
 320. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 35. 
 321. Id.; see also Natalie Unterstell, Brazil:  Maintaining the Resilience of Indigenous 
Territories, in REALISING RIGHTS, PROTECTING FORESTS:  AN ALTERNATIVE VISION FOR 
REDUCING DEFORESTATION 22, 22–25 (2010), available at 
http://www.rainforestfoundationuk.org/files/Accra_Report_English.pdf (noting that the 
existence of indigenous territories, by their very nature, lowers deforestation rates because 
the lands are treated as traditional nature reserves). 
 322. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 37. 
 323. See id. 
 324. See id. 
 325. Id. See generally COTULA, supra note 180 (supporting customary tenure rights for 
indigenous groups because they best protect rights and the environment). 
 326. See Background Analysis of REDD Regulatory Frameworks, supra note 80, at 50. 
 327. See, e.g., Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff et al., Reducing Forest Emissions in the 
Amazon Basin:  A Review of Drivers of Land-Use Change and How Payments for 
Environmental Services (PES) Schemes Can Affect Them 11–13 (Ctr. for Int’l Forestry 
Research, Working Paper No. 40, 2008), available at http://www.cifor.org/publications/
pdf_files/WPapers/WP41Wertz-Kanounnikoff.pdf (noting that PES-REDD schemes have 
generally been successful in Latin America, but have not worked as well in other regions).   
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a provider, if the provider agrees to safeguard the service.328  PES programs 
are different from typical command-and-control environmental regulations 
because they are both voluntary and conditional.329  Thus, in the REDD 
context, payments only occur after participants agree to avoid deforestation 
and after some sort of verification takes place.330
In Brazil, the most widely publicized PES-REDD program is the Bolsa 
Floresta Forest Conservation Grant Program (Bolsa Floresta), which was 
created under the Amazonas State Law for Climate Change.  Bolsa Floresta 
was established to pay forest-dwelling communities for their role in forest 
protection, and its primary objectives are to avoid deforestation and 
improve the livelihood of indigenous communities.  The program thus 
rewards indigenous communities who have demonstrated a commitment to 
avoid deforestation.
 
331
Implemented in September 2007, Bolsa Floresta is managed and financed 
by the Amazonas Sustainable Foundation (FAS), the public Secretariat for 
Environmental and Sustainable Development, and Bradesco, which is the 
largest private bank in Brazil.
 
332  The FAS received an initial endowment 
fund of approximately $23 million, from both governmental and private 
investors.333  In addition, the Marriott International Hotel Chain has agreed 
to provide funding, with an initial deposit of $2 million.334  To receive 
funds, Bolsa Floresta participants must:  (1) have lived on the State 
Conservation Unit for at least two years; (2) keep crop and pasture areas not 
larger than those of the year the Forest Conservation Grant Program was 
instituted; (3) be registered and regularly attend the school, if the families 
have children; (4) participate in a Community Dwellers Association; (5) 
participate in the construction and implementation of the Conservation 
Units and Management Plan, and (6) participate in an introductory 
workshop and sign an Zero Deforestation Agreement.335  Importantly, land 
ownership is not a requirement.336
As of November 2008, Bolsa Floresta covered six reserves or protected 
areas in Brazil, and made payments to 2,102 families in Amazonas state.
 
337
 
 328. Sven Wunder, Payments for Environmental Services:  Some Nuts and Bolts 3–4  
(Ctr. for Int’l Forestry Research, Working Paper No. 42, 2005), available at 
http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/OccPapers/OP-42.pdf (recognizing that it is hard 
to find examples of “true PES,” as many PES schemes are not actually conditional, but 
instead issue payments in advance based on flexible contracts). 
  
One of the largest REDD projects that utilizes Bolsa Floresta is the Juma 
 329. See id. at 6 (noting that while they offer a stark contrast to command-and-control 
mechanisms, PES systems can exist with traditional rigid regulations). 
 330. See IVAN BOND ET AL., INCENTIVES TO SUSTAIN FOREST ECOSYSTEM SERVICES:  A 
REVIEW AND LESSONS FOR REDD 5–6 (2009). 
 331. See Wertz-Kanounnikoff et al., supra note 327, at 13 (explaining how payments are 
issued to individuals and communities that volunteer to halt deforestation practices). 
 332. Id. at 11. 
 333. See Juma PDD, supra note 253, at 47. 
 334. See id. 
 335. See Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 133 (noting that these requirements 
are a part of Brazilian Decree no. 26.958/2007). 
 336. Id. 
 337. Wertz-Kanounnikoff et al., supra note 327, at 11. 
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Sustainable Development Reserve Project for Reducing Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Deforestation338 (Juma Project).  The Juma Project was the 
first project to receive Gold Level Certification from the CCB Standards, 
which estimate that “Juma’s REDD scheme will prevent an estimated 3.6 
million tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions . . . over the first crediting 
period, from 2006 to 2016.  By the project’s end in 2050, it is expected to 
have generated about 190 million tonnes of CO2e credits.”339
In addition to these economic benefits, Juma provides payments to 
indigenous families.
 
340  The majority of the families living in the Juma 
Reserve do not have formal land titles or personal documentation, yet they 
are remunerated to protect the rainforest by receiving roughly $30 per 
month, which is issued to the female head of each household.341  Before 
they receive payment, families must take a two-day training course that 
teaches about sustainable land use management.342  Then each family signs 
a contract, binding them not to cut or burn the trees, which will be 
supervised by regular inspections.  In the event of deforestation, the FAS 
will stop issuing payments.343
In addition to paying families, Bolsa Floresta issues payments to family 
associations, community groups, and social programs.  Family associations 
receive a “cash grant averaging $500/month per association plus in-kind 
grant of equipment (such as boat or internet connection).”
 
344  Community 
Associations receive $2,500 per year, and social programs are granted 
approximately $70,000 per year, in the “form of small investments (for 
example, in education or health) complementing state and local government 
programmes.”345
In general, Brazil has successfully incorporated REDD policies into its 
pre-existing national legal frameworks.  In addition to national laws that 
protect indigenous customary property rights, Brazil has state laws that 
have allowed for great variation among REDD pilot projects.  The most 
  Because the Bolsa Floresta program is relatively new, 
many of its effects have not been measured or studied.  Although Bolsta 
Floresta has received the CCBA’s Gold Standard designation, it remains to 
be seen whether the program could be replicated in other parts of the world. 
 
 338. See generally Juma PDD, supra note 253. 
 339. Virgilio M. Viana et al., The Costs of REDD:  Lessons from Amazonas, INT’L INST. 
FOR ENV’T & DEV., 2 (Nov. 2009), http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17076IIED.pdf. 
 340. See Juma PDD, supra note 253, at 80 (noting that by directing funds towards the 
female head of each household, the Juma Project aims to combat gender inequality, as well 
as indigenous inequality). 
 341. See Wertz-Kanounnikoff et al., supra note 327, at 11. 
 342. See id. 
 343. See id. at 12–14; see also Brazil:  Juma Test Case in the Amazon, WORLD 
RAINFOREST MOVEMENT, http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/155/Brazil.html (last visited Oct. 
20, 2011) (noting that some indigenous groups have argued that the Juma Reserve’s monthly 
payment is not enough to compensate for the loss of livelihood that indigenous groups 
experience when they stop deforestation practices). 
 344. Viana, supra note 339, at 2 (noting that the Juma Reserve Project was the first 
voluntary REDD project to receive the Gold Standard designation from the CCBA, in large 
part because of the Project’s active efforts to fund families and community groups). 
 345. Id. 
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successful of these projects is the Juma Reserve project, funded by Bolsa 
Floresta, in the State of Amazonas.  Indigenous groups have been 
compensated for their REDD contributions, regardless of whether they have 
statutory land rights.   
B.  Indonesia 
This Note will now explore how REDD interacts with indigenous rights 
in another nation with extreme deforestation, Indonesia.  With between 90 
and 100 million ha of forestland inside its borders, Indonesia is the third 
most heavily forested nation in the world, after Brazil and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.346  Indonesia’s forests sequester approximately 3.5 
billion tons of carbon347 and provide livelihood to at least 20 million 
people.348  Even so, deforestation occurs at alarming rates, as timber 
concessions, fires, roads, and mining all threaten Indonesia’s forests.  Exact 
statistics regarding deforestation in Indonesia are inconsistent; Indonesia’s 
Ministry of Forestry estimates that the country lost 2.83 million ha of forest 
per year to deforestation between 1997 and 2000,349 while the FAO 
estimates that Indonesia’s annual deforestation rate was 1.87 million ha for 
the same period.350  Further complicating Indonesia’s deforestation data, 
the World Bank approximates that 28 percent of the country’s public 
forestland is actually devoid of trees.351
Regardless of statistical discrepancies, it is widely agreed that 
Indonesia’s forests are in grave danger.
 
352
 
 346. See Christopher Barr et al., Decentralization of Forest Administration in Indonesia:  
An Overview, in DECENTRALIZATION OF FOREST ADMINISTRATION IN INDONESIA 1, 2 
(Christopher Barr et al. ed., 2006); see also Indonesia’s Forests in Brief, GLOBAL FOREST 
WATCH, http://www.globalforestwatch.org/english/indonesia/forests.htm (last visited Oct. 
20, 2011) (noting that Indonesia currently has approximately 98 million ha of forestland, 
down from 162 million ha in 1950). 
  Recognizing that REDD can be 
economically and environmentally beneficial, Indonesia’s government has 
acted at both the global and local levels to ensure that REDD becomes a 
reality.  Internationally, Indonesia and Australia have entered into a bilateral 
 347. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 46. 
 348. See Barr et al., supra note 346, at 3 (highlighting that 20 million is a conservative 
estimate). 
 349. See United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, Nagoya, Japan, Oct. 18–29, 
2010, Analysis of Information in the Fourth National Reports ¶ 3(g), 
UNEP/CBD/COP/10/INF/2 (Oct. 22, 2010); see also Fitrian Ardiansyah, National 
Institutional Arrangements for REDD Case Study:  Indonesia (as of December 2009), 
WORLD WIDE FORESTS, 2 (Dec. 2009), http://www.theredddesk.org/sites/default/files/
resources/pdf/2010/report_7_indonesia.pdf. 
 350. See State of the World’s Forests 2007, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORG. OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/docrep/009/a0773e/a0773e00.HTM (last visited Oct. 20, 
2011). 
 351. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 46. 
 352. See generally REDD in Indonesia:  An Independent Monitoring Report by Forest 
Watch Indonesia (2009), http://vh-gfc.dpi.nl/img/userpics/File/REDD/REDD-in-
Indonesia.pdf. 
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REDD alliance.353  The Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership 
(IAFCP) was the first developed-developing country partnership to submit a 
joint proposal to the UNFCCC,354 and together the two countries have 
implemented a number of REDD pilot projects in Indonesia that are 
discussed further in Part II.B.4.  Domestically, Indonesia is home to 
approximately twenty voluntary REDD pilot programs.355  Each REDD 
project uses different rules and regulations, and may be sponsored by 
NGOs, corporations, or governments.356  In an effort to unify Indonesia’s 
REDD projects, the national government recently passed legislation 
specifically related to REDD implementation, making it the first—and 
only—country in the world to do so.357
Indonesia is an important case study because of its unique national 
REDD legislation.  Implemented amidst an intense political power struggle 
between the central and provincial governments, Indonesia’s national 
REDD Law has the potential to clarify the country’s REDD regime, but 
may also limit indigenous rights and participation.
 
358  In recent history, 
Indonesia’s administrative authority has shifted back and forth between 
national and local governments.359
1.  Indonesia’s Governmental Power Struggle 
  This section explains the effect that 
decentralization—and recentralization—has had on indigenous rights in 
REDD, specifically elaborating on how the laws regarding REDD 
financing, carbon property rights, and REDD benefit distribution have 
changed in light of the governmental power shift. 
Indonesia’s national government has historically exercised primary 
control over the country’s forestry practices.360  After the collapse of the 
Soeharto New Order regime,361
 
 353. See IAFCP Factsheet, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY (Dec. 2009), www.ausaid.gov.au/hottopics/pdf/IAFCP_factsheet_2_
11Dec09.pdf. 
 however, government restructuring caused 
 354. See id. 
 355. See Adianto P. Simamora, Government Delays Awarding Permits for REDD 
Projects, JAKARTA POST (Feb. 7, 2009), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/02/07/
government-delays-awarding-permits-redd-projects.html. 
 356. See Beth Askham, REDD Pilot Projects in Indonesia, ECOS ONLINE MAG. (Dec. 10, 
2010), http://ecosmagazine.com/paper/EC10048.htm. 
 357. P.30/Menhut-II/2009 [Regulation on Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation Procedure], May 1, 2009; see also Background Analysis of REDD 
Regulatory Frameworks, supra note 80, at 11. 
 358. See generally Moira Moeliono & Ahmad Dermawan, The Impacts of 
Decentralization on Forests and Livelihood, in DECENTRALIZATION OF FOREST 
ADMINISTRATION IN INDONESIA, supra note 346, at 108 (explaining that indigenous groups 
have more opportunities to participate in local decision-making). 
 359. See, e.g., Barr et al., supra note 346, at 1–3. 
 360. See id. at 1. 
 361. Soeharto was the authoritarian leader of Indonesia from 1966 to 1998.  His 
government, called the New Order regime, was highly centralized, reserving most of the 
nation’s power for the President.  For further information on the Soeharto regime, see 
RETNOWATI ABDULGANI-KNAPP, SOEHARTO:  THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF INDONESIA’S SECOND 
PRESIDENT (2007) and R.E. ELSON, SUHARTO:  A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY (2009). 
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administrative power to be reallocated to district and local governments.362  
This process of decentralization occurred in all aspects of Indonesian law, 
but had a particularly dramatic impact on the forestry sector, as forest-
dwelling communities reestablished control over forestland.363  Recently 
there has been a backlash against decentralization.  As indicated by the new 
national REDD legislation, the power pendulum is swinging back towards 
the central government.364
a.  Decentralization and Deforestation 
  This section compares Indonesia’s forestry laws 
under decentralized and recentralized regimes, emphasizing how well 
indigenous rights have been upheld under each. 
Indonesia’s central government took control of the forestry sector in the 
early twentieth century; as colonization came to an end, and the Ministry of 
Forestry began nationalizing forestland that was once privately owned by 
foreigners.365  When Soeharto’s New Order regime gained power in 1966, 
the national government enacted legislation that gave it almost absolute 
control over Indonesia’s forestry practices.366  Under Indonesia’s Basic 
Forestry Law of 1967, for example, the government classified over 143 
million ha of forest as public land, disregarding customary land claims and 
giving the central government sweeping power over approximately one-
third of the nation’s total forested area.367
The central government’s control led to a “forestry crisis” in 
Indonesia.
 
368  Through the Basic Forestry Law, the Ministry of Forestry 
granted commercial timber concessions on over 60 million ha of the state-
controlled land.369
 
 362. See, e.g., Barr et al., supra note 
  The central government benefitted from the 
concessions, as both private and state owned timber companies were 
required to pay fees and royalties directly to the national government, 
346, at 1–3; see also Tony Djogo & Rudi Syaf, 
Decentralization without Accountability:  Power and Authority over Local Forest 
Governance in Indonesia (2004), http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/
10535/1611/Djogo_Decentralization_040308_Paper565a.pdf. 
 363. See Barr et al., supra note 346, at 2. 
 364. Christopher Barr et al., Decentralization’s Effects on Forest Concessions and Timber 
Production, in DECENTRALIZATION OF FOREST ADMINISTRATION IN INDONESIA, supra note 
346, at 87, 103. 
 365. See Country Overview:  Indonesia, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS (Timothy L. 
Gall & Jeneen M. Hobby eds., 12th ed. 2007), available at 
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Asia-and-the-Pacific/Indonesia.html. 
 366. See Barr et al., supra note 346, at 1. 
 367. See Undang-undang Pokok-pokok Kehutanan 5/1967 [Basic Forestry Law], May 
1967; see also Takacs, supra note 186, at 47 (noting that the central government possessed 
the decision-making powers to determine which areas should be classified as forest, and to 
determine commercial licensing and utilization of forest products). 
 368. Christopher Barr, Forest Administration and Forestry Sector Development Prior to 
1998, in DECENTRALIZATION OF FOREST ADMINISTRATION IN INDONESIA, supra note 346, at 
18, 28. 
 369. See Barr et al., supra note 346, at 1. 
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bypassing district governments and local communities.370  As a result of 
these forestry practices, by 1978 half of the world’s timber was exported 
from Indonesia,371 and from 1985 to 1999 an estimated 1.6 million ha of 
Indonesia’s forest cover was lost each year due to deforestation or forest 
degradation.372
After thirty-two years in power, the Soeharto regime collapsed in May of 
1998, leading to “intense political struggles” between Indonesia’s national, 
provincial, and district governments.
 
373  As separatist movements sprouted 
up across the country—especially in resource-rich regions, such as Aceh, 
Papua, and East Timor—Indonesia’s post-Soeharto leaders recognized that 
“autonomy for . . . regional governments [was] an unavoidable tradeoff for 
maintaining Indonesia’s status as a unitary republic.”374  Thus, from 1999 
to 2002, the central government enacted legislation to transfer 
administrative authority from the national government to local leaders in an 
effort to balance power and “maintain Indonesia’s integrity as a nation.”375  
The most significant enactments—Law 22/1999 on Regional Governance 
and Law 25/1999 on Fiscal Balancing between the Central Government and 
Regional Governments—did not pertain specifically to forestry; however, 
by forming the foundation of Indonesia’s decentralization movement, both 
laws dramatically impacted the forestry sector.376
In addition, the Basic Forestry Law of 1999 was enacted, replacing the 
1967 Law.
 
377  The 1999 Law pledged to create a decentralized forest 
regime that would “accommodate the dynamic of community aspirations 
and participation, customary and cultural, and social values.”378  District 
governments eagerly took advantage of the opportunity to control the 
natural resources within their jurisdictions, and forest-dwelling peoples 
began to reestablish ownership over land that was under State control 
during the New Order period.379  After thirty-two years under a centralized 
regime, district and local actors generally felt it was their turn to benefit 
from forest resources.380
 
 370. See Barr, supra note 
  This feeling of entitlement did not manifest itself 
368, at 24 (explaining how funds were allocated between the 
central and local governments, with taxes and earmarks that went directly to the central 
government). 
 371. See Country Overview:  Indonesia, supra note 365. 
 372. See Barr, supra note 368, at 28. 
 373. See id. at 31. 
 374. See id. 
 375. See id. at 10. 
 376. See id.; see also Takacs, supra note 186, at 47 (noting that Indonesia’s Law 22/1999 
and Regulation 25/2000 delineate the division of powers between central and local 
governments, reserving the following decision-making powers for the central government:  
determining what areas will be classified as forest, setting tariffs and fees for forest 
resources, allocating commercial permits, and designing criteria for licensing in forests). 
 377. See Undang-undang tentang Kehutanan 41/1999 [Law on Forestry], Sept. 1999, 
available at http://www.bkpm.go.id/file_uploaded/Law_4199.htm. 
 378. Id.; see infra Part II.B.2. 
 379. See Barr et al., supra note 346, at 2 (noting that indigenous communities felt they 
had been robbed of their land entitlements under the Soeharto regime, and thus believed they 
were reestablishing ownership over land that was rightfully theirs). 
 380. See id. 
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in forest conservation efforts, however.  Local governments and 
communities simply began granting concessions to—and receiving benefits 
from—small-scale timber companies, rather than implementing practices 
that would protect the forests.381
b.  Recentralization and REDD 
 
After three years of extensive decentralization, the central government 
attempted to regain control of the forestry sector.  The Ministry of Forestry 
claimed that decentralization had “highly damaging” effects on Indonesia’s 
forests.382  Referencing the Constitution, which states that forests must be 
managed by the national government to provide sustainable benefits to all 
Indonesians,383 the Ministry of Forestry adopted measures to curtail 
decentralization in 2002.384  It is within this context that the Indonesian 
Minister of Forestry signed Regulation P.30/2009 on Procedures for 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD 
Regulation) in May 2009, enacting the world’s first “national legal regime 
for the implementation of REDD projects, and the issuance and trading of 
carbon credits in respect of the greenhouse gas reductions such projects 
generate.”385  REDD Regulation grants the national government power over 
REDD demonstration activities, monitoring and verification mechanisms, 
and carbon sequestration projects.386
2.  Phases of REDD Financing 
 
While it is too soon for effects of REDD Regulation to be analyzed, 
many indigenous groups have expressed concern that a centralized legal 
framework will prevent forest-dwelling peoples from participating in and 
receiving benefits from REDD programs.  The remainder of this section 
examines the interplay between the new REDD Regulation and existing 
Indonesian laws regarding REDD financing, property rights, and benefit 
distribution. 
Indonesia advocates a phased approach to REDD implementation, both 
in its domestic legislation and international REDD proposals.387  The three 
separate stages of Indonesia’s REDD plan—REDD Preparation, REDD 
Readiness, and Full Implementation—call for different methods of 
financing.388
 
 381. See id. 
  Both Preparation and Readiness utilize international REDD 
 382. See id. 
 383. 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Aug. 18, 1945, art. 33, available at 
http://www.humanrights.asia/countries/indonesia/laws/uud1945_en.  
 384. See Barr et al., supra note 346, at 1. 
 385. See Background Analysis of REDD Regulatory Frameworks, supra note 80, at 11. 
 386. See id. at 12–13. 
 387. See Nur Masripatin et al., National Strategy:  REDD-Indonesia Readiness Phase 
2009–2012 and Progress in Implementation, 11 (Feb. 2010), http://www.forda-mof.org/
uploads/2010/buku%20redd%20versi%20english.pdf. 
 388. Id.; see also Ardiansyah, supra note 349, at 12, 17 (noting that Indonesia has also 
submitted proposals to the FCPF and UN-REDD Program, both of which advocate 
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funds, while Full Implementation, due to begin in 2012, would be market-
based.  In this manner, Indonesia’s REDD programs will be using a hybrid 
method of financing.389
Indonesia’s three-phase REDD approach was developed in conjunction 
with Australia, through the IAFCP.
 
390  The REDD Preparation Phase took 
place from 2007 to 2008, as a “quick analysis” on Indonesia’s REDD 
preparedness, in terms of technological and political capabilities to 
implement REDD.391  After assessing its REDD capacity, Indonesia moved 
into its REDD Readiness phase, referred to as REDDI.392  This phase is 
currently ongoing, as Indonesia focuses on capacity building and 
Demonstration Activities from 2009 to 2012.  Both of these stages have 
been financed from international funds.393  At the national level, Norway 
has pledged $1 billion to Indonesia for Readiness activities.  Additionally, 
Australia donated $40 million to Indonesia’s REDD fund in 2008, with $30 
million going towards the Kalimantan Forests and Climate Partnership, and 
$10 million in a general “bilateral package of support for Indonesia on 
forests and climate.”394  To build REDD capacity, this money will be 
allocated in three main areas:  “policy cooperation under the UNFCCC and 
capacity building support; technical support to increase Indonesia’s forest 
carbon measurement capacity; and identifying and implementing incentive-
based practical REDD activities.”395
Indonesia hopes to implement market-linked REDD fully by 2012, in 
accordance with the expected UNFCCC international legislation.  Under its 
REDD Law, Indonesia advocates a market-based mechanism that would 
generate tradable REDD credits.  Hybrid funding works well in Indonesia 
because of its weak tenure rights, which will be discussed further in Part 
II.B.3.  Generally, countries “with weak legal, institutional and governance 
structures [are not] in the position to assure long-term compliance with the 
requirements of a mandatory market mechanism.”
 
396
 
implementation of REDD in phases in order to build capacity for REDD markets in 
developing countries). 
  Thus, Indonesia’s 
phased approach, with an emphasis on capacity building, is beneficial as the 
 389. See Macintosh, supra note 123, at 5 (noting that hybrid-based funding uses a 
combination of market-linked REDD and forestry funds). 
 390. See IAFCP Factsheet, supra note 353; see also Action Under the International 
Forest Carbon Initiative, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY, http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/international-forest-
carbon-initiative/action.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
 391. See Masripatin et al., supra note 387, at 11. 
 392. See id. at 10–13. 
 393. See id. at 10. 
 394. See IAFCP Factsheet, supra note 353 (noting that Australia is planning on donating 
an additional $40 million for future REDD pilot projects in Indonesia). 
 395. Id. 
 396. Laura Ximena, Why Are We Seeing “REDD”?  An Analysis of the International 
Debate on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation in Developing 
Countries, INSTITUT DU DÉVELOPPEMENT DURABLE ET DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES, 18–
19 (2007), http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Analyses/An_0702_Rubio&
Wertz_REDD.pdf. 
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country sorts out its complicated tenure issues before transitioning into 
market-based REDD. 
3.  Ownership of Land and Carbon in Indonesia 
As mentioned above, the Basic Forestry Law of 1967 allowed the central 
government to convert 143 million ha of Indonesia’s forests to public land, 
overriding the customary land rights of indigenous communities who had 
been living in the forests for generations.397  Indigenous groups protested 
against forestry practices that gave State interests precedence over 
customary rights, changing the legal status of forests from adat,398 or 
customary lands, to State land without informing or receiving consent from 
indigenous groups.399
In part because of indigenous community protests, post-Soeharto leaders 
determined that the 1967 Basic Forestry Law was not “compatible” with the 
goal of “sustainable forest management . . . able to accommodate the 
dynamic of community aspirations and participation, customary and 
cultural, and social values in accordance with national norms.”
 
400  Thus, the 
government enacted the Basic Forestry Law of 1999 (Law 41/1999) in 
order to replace the 1967 law of the same name.  Although its rhetoric 
recognizes “customary law communities” and ensures “compensation if 
indigenous communities’ traditional areas become designated as national 
forest areas,” Law 41/1999 is similar to its predecessor in that it vests 
exclusive authority over untitled forestland in the national government, 
without any special provision for the ownership rights of indigenous 
peoples.401  Further, Law 41/1999 allows the State to issue concessions 
over any forestland at its discretion.402
[T]he Nation gives the [Central] Government authority to organize and 
regulate everything associated with forests, the forest estate, and forest 
products; to define the forest estate and/or change the status of the forest 
estate; to define and regulate legal relationships between people and 
forests or the forest estate and forest products; and to control the 
formulation of laws related to forestry. Therefore, the [Central] 
  An “official elucidation” 
accompanying Law 41/1999 emphasized the “far-reaching authority” of the 
national government: 
 
 397. See supra note 367 and accompanying text. 
 398. See Barr et al., supra note 346, at xiv (defining adat as rights and communities based 
in rights that are “customary or traditional, a rich and complex concept touching on law, 
tenure, religion, symbolism, practice, and ethnicity”). 
 399. Indonesian Indigenous Peoples Question New Forestry Law, WORLD RAINFOREST 
MOVEMENT, http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/23/Indonesia.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) 
(stating that, according to the Alliance of Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago, the 1967 
Basic Forestry Law allowed the government to “unilaterally seize[] control of tens of 
millions of hectares of customary forest lands which have been handed down . . . , owned, 
controlled and managed by . . . Indonesia’s indigenous peoples”). 
 400. Law on Forestry, supra note 377. 
 401. See id. 
 402. Id. 
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Government has authority to allocate rights and permits to other parties 
to carry out activities in the field of forestry.403
Despite the absence of national adat recognition, some district 
governments have issued decrees recognizing adat forestry rights.
 
404  The 
system is generally marked by a lack of legal clarity, however, undermining 
most indigenous peoples’ claims to forestland.  Adat lands are “generally 
unmapped and not protected by statutory law.”405  Additionally, the 
protection of adat rights has been difficult because outsiders are generally 
not aware of—or choose to ignore—adat claims.406  To have their adat 
claims recognized, indigenous groups generally try to reconstruct history.  
Although this “contest over time and place” is the most common way to 
legitimize adat claims, it is not very effective, as Law 41/1999 does not 
allow indigenous groups to gain formal title over land via adverse 
possession.407  Unlike in Brazil, groups cannot acquire title to land by 
“improving” a plot of land through farming or other development.408
Proponents argue that this system removes a major incentive for 
deforestation and simplifies the allocation of property rights.  Critics, on the 
other hand, note that this is potentially harmful to indigenous peoples, since 
untitled land will always belong to the State, thus removing any possibility 
that the customary land rights of indigenous peoples will be respected.  The 
United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) has repeatedly urged Indonesia to review its laws “to ensure that 
they respect the rights of indigenous peoples to possess, develop, control 
and use their communal lands.”
 
409  As a result, the new Law has generated 
much controversy, and Indonesia’s forestry practices continue to be 
criticized by indigenous communities.410
Although adat communities believe that their customary land rights 
should be recognized out of principles of equity, they do not necessarily 
advocate the best environmental policies.  Many indigenous groups want 
title to their land so that they can receive benefits from timber 
concessions.
 
411
 
 403. John McCarthy et al., Origins and Scope of Indonesia’s Decentralization Laws, in  
DECENTRALIZATION OF FOREST ADMINISTRATION IN INDONESIA, supra note 
  Current legislation in Indonesia does not recognize a 
346, at 33, 44–45, 
(emphasis added) (quoting official elucidation of Law 41/1999). 
 404. Id. 
 405. Moeliono & Dermawansupra, supra note 358, at 112. See generally Max Gluckman, 
Adat Law in Indonesia 31 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L. 60, 63 (1945). 
 406. See generally Gamma Galudra et al., Hot Spot of Emission and Confusion:  Land 
Tenure Insecurity, Contested Policies and Competing Claims in the Central Kalimantan Ex-
Mega Rice Project Area (World Agroforestry Ctr., Working Paper No. 98, 2010), available 
at http://www.worldagroforestry.org/downloads/publications/PDFs/WP16601.pdf. 
 407. Moeliono & Dermawansupra, supra note 358, at 112. 
 408. Id. 
 409. Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination:  Indonesia, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/IDN/CO/3 (2007). 
 410. Indigenous Peoples Question New Forestry Law, supra note 399. 
 411. Moeliono & Dermawansupra, supra note 358, at 112 (“While adat communities 
clearly would like to have rights over their ancestral territories and forest resources formally 
recognized under Indonesian law, this does not always mean that such groups are willing and 
capable to manage and protect these resources in a sustainable manner . . . many customary 
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separate property right in forest carbon, but rather grants carbon ownership 
to the owner of forestland.412
4.  Distribution of Benefits 
  Thus, there is a great opportunity for 
incentive-based REDD schemes to reward adat communities for becoming 
stewards of the forests, and the carbon stored within them.  Because of the 
controversy over indigenous tenure rights, however, REDD benefits often 
bypass adat groups.   
Indonesia’s decentralization movement began in large part because of 
local communities’ insistence that they receive an equitable distribution of 
forest benefits.413  As the national government aims to recentralize forestry 
practices, including REDD, local groups fear that they will once again be 
pushed aside.  The national government is currently entitled to take 30 
percent of all credits issued in Indonesian REDD projects, in order to 
manage its own national and international REDD commitments.414  This 
money is frequently not seen by indigenous communities.  The remaining 
70 percent of REDD revenue is supposed to be given to regional 
governments, who allot some money to a “Reforestation Fund” and 
distribute the rest to the community, either via community services or direct 
payments.415  Frequently, the money is tied up as governments spend time 
negotiating how the money will be distributed, and local peoples do not see 
the benefits.416
The money that is distributed to local communities is generally in the 
form of PES payments.  Because decentralization reforms in Indonesia have 
led to local communities negotiating with timber companies for logging 
agreements,
 
417 PES distribution seems as though it would be an ideal way 
to implement REDD.  However, because of weak customary tenure rights 
and the persistence of commercial loggers who are willing to pay 
indigenous groups who lack formal land title, PES frequently does not work 
in Indonesia.418  Instead of enticing communities to stop logging, PES 
entices timber companies to offer more money for deforestation services.  
Unintentionally, PES in Indonesia is competing with—and losing to—
industrial scale timber companies.419
 
communities use adat claims as a strategy to protect forests, many also feel it is easier to sell 
exploitation rights for a share in the revenue.”).   
 
 412. Takacs, supra note 186, at 46. 
 413. See supra note 379 and accompanying text. 
 414. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 46 (“Over the past year, Indonesia’s Ministry of 
Forestry has developed a series of decrees defining how REDD activities should be carried 
out and evaluated [including] . . . Permenhut No 36/2009 [that] . . . regulates REDD projects 
with defined revenue sharing allocations for local communities, project developers, and the 
different levels of government . . . based on the project and forest type.”).   
 415. See id. at 47. 
 416. See id. 
 417. See generally Stefanie Engel, Payments for Environmental Services as an 
Alternative to Logging Under Weak Property Rights:  The Case of Indonesia 65 
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 799 (2008). 
 418. See id. 
 419. See id. at 800. 
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Both Brazil and Indonesia face unique struggles as they implement their 
national REDD legal frameworks.  However, the lessons that can be learned 
from both nations’ experiences are universal.   
III.  REALITIES OF REDD:  HOW TO BEST PROTECT INDIGENOUS RIGHTS     
IN THE GLOBAL REDD REGIME 
Although the majority of REDD research has focused on policy practices 
thus far,420 the legal implications of REDD deserve more scrutiny, as 
national laws will directly influence how REDD is practiced on the 
ground.421  As explained in Part I, protection of indigenous rights is crucial 
in REDD programs, not only because of international human rights 
obligations, but also because REDD will not be successful without the 
cooperation of the forest-dwelling peoples who choose whether or not to cut 
down trees on a day-to-day basis.422
Part III begins by addressing the threshold question of whether a national 
legal framework is necessary for rights protection in REDD.  After 
answering that question in the affirmative, Part III then makes specific 
recommendations for REDD national legal frameworks, based on Part II’s 
comparison of REDD regulation in Brazil and Indonesia. 
 
A.  National Legal Frameworks Are Crucial to Rights Protection in REDD 
Since REDD reached the forefront of climate change negotiations in 
2005, the international community has agreed upon vague REDD 
regulations that will govern avoided deforestation projects in the post-
Kyoto protocol commitment period.423  Although its inclusion in Kyoto’s 
successor is regarded as a foregone conclusion, REDD policy remains 
uncertain.424  REDD is currently a clutter of inconsistent pilot projects, 
causing its practical realities to vary.  One common theme of REDD 
programs, however, is that their effects on indigenous communities are 
determined by pilot project policies, rather than the obscure language on 
safeguards that is found in international agreements.425
At 2010’s COP-16, UNFCCC negotiators seemed to recognize that one 
international REDD agreement will not fit all national REDD scenarios, and 
emphasized the important role that State laws play in establishing 
comprehensive REDD plans.
 
426
 
 420. See Iza, supra note 
  The Cancun Accord encourages each 
country that participates in REDD activities to develop national REDD 
regulations, emphasizing the need for each State to develop a national 
reference level of GHG emissions from deforestation, a national forest 
monitoring system to measure changes in forest cover, and national 
17, at ix. 
 421. See Iza, supra note 17, at ix. 
 422. See supra Part I.D. 
 423. See, e.g., Cancun Accord, supra note 61; Copenhagen Accord, supra note 24. 
 424. See supra notes 54–70 and accompanying text. 
 425. See supra Part I.C. 
 426. Cancun Accord, supra note 61, § C, ¶ 71(a)–(d). 
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safeguards to protect the rights of indigenous peoples.427  Although the 
Cancun Accord’s guidelines for rights safeguards are vague, they seem to 
acknowledge the precarious situation that indigenous groups are currently 
in as a result of REDD.428  Because international agreements do not provide 
strong language regarding rights protections, indigenous groups are 
frequently at the mercy of REDD pilot projects run by private companies 
who are not bound by international human rights laws.429
National governments, on the other hand, are required to respect 
international treaty obligations.  The right to property can be found in the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which, although non-binding, is a 
cornerstone of rights protection and is respected across the globe.
  Currently, most 
voluntary REDD projects are contract based, causing indigenous peoples to 
be subject to terms and conditions of agreements that they may not 
understand. 
430  
Additionally, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples specifically mentions that indigenous groups have the rights to 
property and the right to “free, prior, and informed consent.”431  Most of the 
world has signed UNDRIP, demonstrating some level of respect for 
indigenous rights.  Further, ILO Convention 169 promotes the indigenous 
right to self-determination.432  Although only ratified by twenty nations, 
ILO 169 is an influential document that impacts the way governments—not 
private companies—treat indigenous groups.  Because their fundamental 
rights are best protected by national governments with treaty obligations, 
indigenous groups are best served by national REDD frameworks that turn 
the principles of human rights documents into practice.433
In addition, the lives of indigenous peoples are more directly impacted by 
national laws than by international agreements.
 
434  As evidenced by the 
discussion of Brazil and Indonesia, national decrees impact the property 
rights and benefit disbursement that accompany REDD programs.435
Further, indigenous groups’ opportunities for participation in REDD 
schemes is greater at the national level than it is at the international level.  
The smaller the scale of REDD programs, the more likely indigenous 
  
Regardless of the text of international agreements, these specific national 
laws change the way forestry practices occur on the ground.  Indigenous 
peoples are subject to national law enforcement and national benefit sharing 
arrangements.  Thus, it is through domestic legal frameworks that true 
rights safeguards can be implemented, as the domestic laws will have more 
of an effect on the day-to-day lives of forest-dwelling peoples. 
 
 427. Id. 
 428. See id. 
 429. See Chestney, supra note 217. 
 430. See Universal Declaration on Human Rights, supra note 168. 
 431. UNDRIP, supra note 156, art. 10. 
 432. See ILO 169, supra note 150. 
 433. See supra notes 150–60. 
 434. See supra notes 243–45. 
 435. See supra Part II. 
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peoples’ voices will be heard during planning and design stages.436  Given 
this greater opportunity for free, prior, and informed consent, indigenous 
rights will inherently be better protected than they would absent national 
REDD legislation.  Bolivia, for example, protested the vague rights 
language in both the Copenhagen and Cancun Accords.437
Overall, international REDD agreements do not adequately protect 
indigenous rights because they use weak language and do not allow for 
sufficient indigenous participation at the negotiation level.
  By developing a 
domestic REDD framework, however, Bolivia can implement tough laws to 
uphold indigenous freedoms. 
438
B.  Recommendations for a Legal Framework                                              
that Best Protects Indigenous Rights 
  Project-level 
REDD contracts also cannot offer rights protection, as they are generally 
signed between big companies and governments who are focused on the 
economics, rather than the equality, of REDD.  Thus, national regulations 
offer indigenous groups the best chance of rights protection.  Because they 
are obligated to uphold human rights agreements, make laws that directly 
impact indigenous peoples, and offer the greatest opportunity for 
indigenous participation during the planning and design stages of REDD, 
national governments can protect indigenous freedoms by creating specific 
legal frameworks to uphold rights in REDD. 
Having argued that indigenous rights in REDD will be best protected 
under national legal frameworks, Part III now offers suggestions for the 
development of a pro-rights REDD regime.  Reflecting on lessons learned 
in Brazil’s and Indonesia’s REDD experiences, Part III.B makes 
recommendations regarding forest governance, REDD financing, property 
rights, and benefits distribution.   
1.  Financing 
Both Brazil and Indonesia use hybrid mechanisms for funding.  Although 
Brazil’s government advocates a fund-based approach to REDD, in 
actuality, Brazil’s federalist system of government uses a hybrid mix.439  
The state pilot projects use market-based REDD in order to generate more 
money for REDD projects, while the national government creates 
international voluntary REDD funds.440
 
 436. See supra Part I.C.3 (discussing how indigenous rights are better protected under 
sub-national and hybrid approaches because they are on a smaller scale than national 
approaches). 
  Thus, in Brazil both methods—
fund- and market-based—are being used simultaneously.  Indonesia, by 
contrast, utilizes hybrid funds in a phased approach.  Indonesia currently 
 437. See supra notes 61–70 and accompanying text. 
 438. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. 
 439. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 440. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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uses fund-based financing, but looks towards market-based funds in the 
future.441
The benefit of Indonesia’s version of hybrid funds is that the nation is 
able to implement capacity-building programs now, to address issues of 
weak forest governance.
 
442  This should help protect indigenous rights 
throughout the REDD regime because rights issues will be taken care of 
before REDD is fully implemented.  While capacity building is essential to 
rights protection in REDD, Brazil’s hybrid approach is ultimately stronger 
than Indonesia’s.  By allowing for market-based REDD at the project level, 
Brazil is able to generate enough funds to implement REDD fully.443
2.  Property Rights 
  In 
addition, by ensuring that there is a national REDD fund, supported by the 
international community, Brazil is both creating a deeper pocket for its 
REDD program and creating built-in rights protection.  Because the REDD 
fund is monitored by the international community, there likely will be more 
scrutiny regarding how the funds are allocated, ensuring that there is 
equitable distribution to forest-dwelling peoples. 
It is essential that each nation has a clear forest tenure system in place 
before implementing REDD.444  Many countries are like Brazil and 
Indonesia, with both statutory and customary land rights.  To ensure that 
REDD respects indigenous rights to land and resource ownership, it is 
essential that the legal framework clearly addresses a dual system of rights.  
While clear tenure is imperative, a specific right in forest carbon is not 
necessary for a successful REDD regime.  Neither Brazil nor Indonesia 
recognizes a separate property right to forest carbon, and instead base their 
forest carbon rights on land rights.445  Indonesia’s indigenous communities 
are not respected under REDD because their adat claims are generally not 
recognized in the country.446  In Brazil, however, customary land rights are 
recognized.  Indigenous groups can create reserves, on which they have 
ownership rights.447  Additionally, Brazil’s REDD benefit distributions are 
not all based on land rights.448
3.  Benefits Distribution 
   Thus, indigenous groups can benefit from 
REDD programs even without recognized tenure. 
 As mentioned above, both Brazil and Indonesia are experimenting with a 
system wherein REDD benefits are distributed via PES systems.  In 
Indonesia, a weak tenure system and governmental corruption have resulted 
 
 441. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 442. See supra Part I.D. (discussing the importance of capacity building in indigenous 
rights). 
 443. See supra Part II.A. 
 444. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 445. See supra Parts II.A.3, II.B.3. 
 446. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 447. See supra notes 322–325. 
 448. See supra Part II.A.4. 
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in a bidding war between PES payments and logging companies.449  While 
some adat communities have benefitted financially from this arrangement, 
the environment is not protected.450  In Brazil, payments are contingent 
upon environmental services, rather than land rights.  Because of this, 
indigenous peoples have greater opportunity to benefit from REDD.  A 
highlight of Brazil’s system is that it distributes payments to both 
individuals and communities, thereby promoting sustainable lifestyles on all 
levels.451
To ensure that the above safeguards are in place, there should be an 
independent monitor to assess the rights situation in each nation before it 
can receive REDD funding, similar to the system that currently exists under 
the voluntary CCB standards.  If the above recommendations are followed, 
REDD can be a win-win situation for both biodiversity and the indigenous 
peoples who inhabit the earth. 
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